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Post by Liquid Len on Nov 18, 2005 15:33:47 GMT -5
From the fact that the experience in some dreams and also in some drug induced trips feels exactly as "real" as the perception of what we call reality, it follows that everything I perceive in life, absolutely everything I ever feel and experience, all my feelings and impressions are nothing else than states of myself. All these impressions are not somewhere "out there", but they emerge in myself. When I'm watching a tree and thus get an impression of that tree, then my impression of the tree isn't the tree itself. And thus everything I perceive of my body is not my body but impressions of my body and nothing more than states of myself. When I'm thinking "I", this "I" is a thought of mine, but it isn't identical with myself, it isn't that what is thinking.
So everything I know is that I am something, a subject that has mental states. What exactly it is, remains utterly unknown to me. I don't know myself, nor the world I'm living in, directly.
Of course it's very plausible to assume that the world and the human beings I perceive do really exist, although I cannot be entirely sure about that. And further, we nowadays have to take note that neuroscience tells us that this something which has mental states is in every human being the brain. Thus my mental states would be identical with the states of the brain which I would be.
This explanation of the emergence of mind doesn't seem very satisfying.
But how could we actually imagine a satisfying explanation? Saying that only a nonphysical soul would be able to have mental states would be an unproven, unverifiable claim. To assume that mind and consciousness are just something distinct which doesn't belong to the world of physics would be no explanation at all. Everything we know are our own subjective mental states. What they would look like from an inter-subjective point of view, we cannot know. Nor can we directly know what the subject is that has them; this would be like a hand trying to grasp itself.
This all seems to suggest a materialistic point of view.
Now some could object that if all mental states were identical with brain states, then our subjective impressions wouldn't be necessary anymore. The brain could as well work completely without them, purely mechanically, and some say that this points to a general problem of materialism. Well, the idea that the brain could work without subjective impressions is true, but this could only be really reality if we presupposed that brain states don't comprise subjective feelings, and as it seems, this isn't the case in our world.
Some might object that brains and matter in general aren't smooth like the mind. Matter consists of molecules, atoms, atomic nuclei and electrons etc, so the question arises how a unified mind could be possible there. Probably the answer would go into the direction of regarding it as a functional unity comparable to the atoms in a PC which nonetheless can enable the playing of a unified computer game, and this isn't very unlike the stream of consciousness, by the way.
Perhaps some might point out that we shouldn't make the stupid mistake of confusing the inside of a brain with the subjective inside of a person only because of the same sound of the words. But I didn't suggest that the brain perceives its own states, but that the states themselves are conscious and the brain only has them. The subjective person isn't the brain, but the sum of the conscious states which together make up the inner life of the person.
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Post by alaina on Nov 18, 2005 19:50:45 GMT -5
This all seems to suggest a materialistic point of view. Up until that point it sounded to me like Representationalism and skepticism. |
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Post by unspammable on Nov 19, 2005 22:10:32 GMT -5
Everything we know are our own subjective mental states. But obviously we know that an external world exists, since 'we' is a plural. |
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Post by Tautalos on Nov 20, 2005 1:02:04 GMT -5
But how could we actually imagine a satisfying explanation? Saying that only a nonphysical soul would be able to have mental states would be an unproven, unverifiable claim. And a physical sould would be something able to be proven, a verifiable claim? Actually, for what was said before, the only certainty that one can have is that one thinks - and that's not a material issue. The thought is non material. So, this does not suggest a materialistic point of view - actually, it suggests radically the opposite. |
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Post by unspammable on Nov 20, 2005 2:05:52 GMT -5
the only certainty that one can have is that one thinks In other words, one cannot be certain that others exist, or that others think. So it is possible for someone to be the only person who exists and everyone else a hallucination. So it is reasonable for one to consider this as a possibility. But by 'one', you obviously mean 'each of us', and for 'each of us' to consider solipsism as a possibility assumes the existence of a plurality of selves (since 'each of us' is plural). It follows from this that solipsism is *not* possible after all. |
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Post by Liquid Len on Nov 20, 2005 10:59:17 GMT -5
But obviously we know that an external world exists, since 'we' is a plural. I was a little sloppy there, actually I should have written “I”, of course. But it doesn’t make a big difference, because later I admitted that Of course it's very plausible to assume that the world and the human beings I perceive do really exist, although I cannot be entirely sure about that. And a physical sould would be something able to be proven, a verifiable claim? It cannot be made 100% certain, but as I said, the neurobiological findings support the view that it’s the brain that thinks, feels, perceives, etc. Actually, for what was said before, the only certainty that one can have is that one thinks - and that's not a material issue. The thought is non material. How do you want to know? What is matter? What you know as matter, i.e. what you call “matter”, isn’t really matter, but just one of your impressions, a picture in your mind. But by 'one', you obviously mean 'each of us', and for 'each of us' to consider solipsism as a possibility assumes the existence of a plurality of selves (since 'each of us' is plural). It follows from this that solipsism is *not* possible after all. I don’t think so. Even if “one” meant “each of us” (of which I am not convinced), such a way of speaking can hardly disprove solipsism. The only thing it could prove is that the person who utters it doesn’t believe in solipsism. |
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Post by Liquid Len on Nov 20, 2005 11:28:49 GMT -5
The only thing it could prove is that the person who utters it doesn’t believe in solipsism. Obviously when I'm saying that this person believes so and so, then I'm assuming the existence of that person, so you can conclude that I don't believe in solipsism (also the fact that I'm discussing with you points into that direction, although I could as well be discussing just for fun, without believing in your existence); but first you you'd have to make the assumption that I'm real. |
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Post by Tautalos on Nov 20, 2005 15:51:09 GMT -5
the only certainty that one can have is that one thinks In other words, one cannot be certain that others exist, or that others think. So it is possible for someone to be the only person who exists and everyone else a hallucination. So it is reasonable for one to consider this as a possibility. So far so good. Now, There must be some misunderstood here. When one says «each one of us», that is, considering the possibility that others exist. However, all those people can be an hallucination. So, when I recognize the «right» of «each one of us» to believe this, I am considering that others exist - yet, all that I can be sure of is that I exist and think. Therefore, solipsism is absolutely possible. |
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Post by Tautalos on Nov 20, 2005 15:59:01 GMT -5
It cannot be made 100% certain, but as I said, the neurobiological findings support the view that it’s the brain that thinks, feels, perceives, etc. Well, according your own thought, one can't be sure that the brain exists, after all. Therefore, the assumption of what you now said, is a pure convenience. Meanwhile, all that materialist science can prove is that the brain is the material support of thought. Not that it is the origin of all thought. For how could something purely material originate something that is not material at all? Something than can be touched, for a start. Something that can be weight. Therefore, once again, even matter can be an invention of a non material principle. |
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Post by Liquid Len on Nov 20, 2005 17:20:12 GMT -5
Well, according your own thought, one can't be sure that the brain exists, after all. Therefore, the assumption of what you now said, is a pure convenience. It's only a question of plausibility. Imagine that you have to undergo a risky brain surgery. And due to bad luck it isn't all that successful, for some important structures in your brain get destroyed. As a consequence you'll be mentally handicapped for the rest of your life. That's a realistic scenario that could take place, in theory. How plausible is it that it takes place without there being a brain? Meanwhile, all that materialist science can prove is that the brain is the material support of thought. Not that it is the origin of all thought. What exactly do you mean by "material support of thought"? For how could something purely material originate something that is not material at all? That's a very good question; I don't know. But actually I suggested that mental states are brain states - and therefore not immaterial. Something than can be touched, for a start. Something that can be weight. If an impression of red is identical with the firing of c-fibres (= purely theoretical figure of speech), it could be touched as well. Therefore, once again, even matter can be an invention of a non material principle. It could. But then again, see my example with the brain damage. |
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Post by unspammable on Nov 20, 2005 19:52:31 GMT -5
There must be some misunderstood here. When one says «each one of us», that is, considering the possibility that others exist. However, all those people can be an hallucination. So, when I recognize the «right» of «each one of us» to believe this, I am considering that others exist - yet, all that I can be sure of is that I exist and think. Then that is a form of personal solipsism, i.e. 'one person may be the only one who exists, so it is reasonable for *me* to consider it.' There is nothing logically wrong with this -- the only problem is that no one will believe you if you told them.  It can be noted, however, that personal solipsism does not have to deny the existence of anything -- to say that 'nothing exists except myself' is to identify the self with all existence, so everything else simply 'exists' as part of my consciousness. |
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Post by Tautalos on Nov 21, 2005 11:59:03 GMT -5
Well, according your own thought, one can't be sure that the brain exists, after all. Therefore, the assumption of what you now said, is a pure convenience. Well, if one is to speak about plausibility, in that case it seems clear that the others exist, the world around us is not an illusion and so, to get a bullet in the chest is deadly dangerous. Therefore, things exist and the initial theory of this thread is not acceptable. It's the hardware of the mind, so to speak. But the thought itself is clearly non material. Well, yes, but red can be reached by the eyes. So, the material world can be defined as what is visible or in some way measured by the senses. |
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Post by Liquid Len on Nov 21, 2005 18:32:29 GMT -5
Well, if one is to speak about plausibility, in that case it seems clear that the others exist, the world around us is not an illusion and so, to get a bullet in the chest is deadly dangerous. Therefore, things exist and the initial theory of this thread is not acceptable. What was the initial theory? I started with some justifiable doubts, yes, but then I soon admitted that... Of course it's very plausible to assume that the world and the human beings I perceive do really exist, although I cannot be entirely sure about that. ...obviously for reasons of plausibility. But this doesn't change my opinion that the perception in our normal awake life is some kind of dream, that it's working according to the same principles. IMO the only difference to a real dream is that it's a dream that is directly based on sense data. The sense organs constantly supply the brain with informations about the world around it, and the brain constructs, like in a dream, a subjective experience, but strictly correponding to the sense data (with exceptions), while in a real dream it's much more free to construct (e.g. whatever the subconscious suggests). It's the hardware of the mind, so to speak. When you use this analogy, then you have to regard the mind as the working activity of the hardware, IMO. So it wouldn't be something independent. Because I think you can't compare the mind with the software. A program is just something like a book full of rules what the hardware has to do and how it has to react. You can also say that it's a formal description of what happens when the hardware works with that program. Now, a human being does have something similar to such a program: It's what is programmed in the genes. But moreover it can be modifed by environmental influences, by the social milieu etc. This program obviously isn't identical to our mind, our consciousness. Instead it's more or less realised in the structure of the brain. But the thought itself is clearly non material. The thought? You mean a certain idea for example? Like when I'm thinking "fish"? Or only something more abstract like "example"? IMO they can all be represented in the brain. The less abstract thoughts are not much more than the memory of things you have seen and for which you have learned a word. The more abstract ones you've learned too, you must have learned a specific meaning for them. I don't quite see the problem. Well, yes, but red can be reached by the eyes. I think the impression "red" is in the brain, it isn't something out there that sticks at the objects. In the first line because of the observations I mentioned in the very beginning of this thread. Furthermore the idea that our red impression is out there and that we perceive it through the eyes like through two little windows leeds to an infinite regress, because then there would have to be a homunculus in the head that stares through the eyes at the world outside. But how then could we explain the perception of this little man? Because he has eyes through which...etc. Secondly, the eyes are not windows but they are connected with nerves that send electric signals to the brain where these inputs are processed in the visual centre of the brain. There's nothing going out of the eyes (a glance), but a lot of information is going into the eyes. So, the material world can be defined as what is visible or in some way measured by the senses. aspects of the material world can be "measured" by the senses (although they are not what one experiences), and as I said, the visual perceptions in some dreams (I'm especially thinking of the so called "lucid dreams", where one is aware of that one is dreaming) and drug experiences can be 100% indistinguishable from the awake perception. So the line between what belongs to the material world and what doesn't, isn't something that can be inferred from the impression alone. (The only thing that is generally different is that the dream "world" doesn't obey strictly to the laws of physics.) Further (and this is important), this all doesn't give you any idea of what it would be like to be a physical object... |
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Post by Tautalos on Nov 22, 2005 0:09:20 GMT -5
Well, if one is to speak about plausibility, in that case it seems clear that the others exist, the world around us is not an illusion and so, to get a bullet in the chest is deadly dangerous. Therefore, things exist and the initial theory of this thread is not acceptable. That was what I was referring to. Then again, all the material sensations and conceptions are part of that dream. Including all your conceptions about what you think that thinks, i.e., the brain. It was not an exact analogy, that's why I said «so to speak». The material world can't supply a proper example for this, because it's a matter of a non materialist conception. Therefore, I would say that such software is before and above the hardware. That can be an indication that the spirit penetrates the matter at the deepest levels. Both. They are both imaterial. They are all in the brain. But you can't be sure if the brain produces it or if the brain is just the material support of it. It does not matter in this case. Such thought is still completely imaterial, no matter how concrete is the subject of that thought. I think it is. If all people died suddenly, if there were no more brains alive, would all red things stop being red? The perception of that little man would be explained by the simple fact that red exist and the intelligent mind realizes it. That would perhaps shaken the idea that everything is build up in the brain. But reality is what it is, independently of all theories. So, the material world can be defined as what is visible or in some way measured by the senses. Are there any aspects of the material world that cannot be measured by the senses? All the impressions that a brain can fabricate under the effect of drugs, are still part of the material world, even if understood in a distorted way. |
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Post by Liquid Len on Nov 23, 2005 9:34:40 GMT -5
Then again, all the material sensations and conceptions are part of that dream. Including all your conceptions about what you think that thinks, i.e., the brain. Yes, but this doesn't invalidate the arguments in favour of such a concept, does it? The problem is that this all sounds very vague. Perhaps you've got a clearer idea of what you mean, but unless you explain it to me, I'm not able to get a proper idea of it, and hence I'm unable to see the difference between what materialist science can prove (according to you) and what not. The thought? You mean a certain idea for example? Like when I'm thinking "fish"? Or only something more abstract like "example"? Both. They are both imaterial. Why? They are all in the brain. If you're agreeing that they are in the brain, then we already agree on much. Now I go on saying that these representations in the brain are for the one who has them (= for the brain that has them) subjectively experienced thoughts. For everyone else they are just activities of brain cells. But you can't be sure if the brain produces it or if the brain is just the material support of it. Can you elaborate a little on that difference? I don't quite understand what you mean. If all people died suddenly, if there were no more brains alive, would all red things stop being red? I don't even believe that they are red now... They've got a certain physical property that causes us to have a red impression if they are lighted properly and if the rays of light that were reflected at them come in contact with our eyes (and if the brain works correctly etc). We even cannot know that our individual impressions of red are identical to each other. The perception of that little man would be explained by the simple fact that red exist and the intelligent mind realizes it. If visual perception worked that way... why do our brains have a visual centre at their backside? It has been proven that if these areas are destroyed by an accident or by illness, then blindness is the consequence, even if the eyes are still fully in function. How would you explain this fact if a perception of red worked like that there is a red impression in front of the eyes and an immaterial mind that measures it by merely looking through these eyes? Are there any aspects of the material world that cannot be measured by the senses? Yes, there are many, like radioactivity or UV- or infrared light etc. All the impressions that a brain can fabricate under the effect of drugs, are still part of the material world, even if understood in a distorted way. I'm not sure if I understand you right. I would agree if you by "are part of the material world" just mean that the impressions are physical states of the brain. However, I would strongly disagree if you want to suggest that drug induced hallucinations can only be distorted perceptions. They can be distorted perceptions, but if you lay down and close your eyes then you can find yourself in a completley different world, a hallucinated world. (There are of course strong differences in the powers of the various drugs.) |
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