Materialism

[Liquid Len]

Tautalos, what you absolutely could speculate is that the subjective impressions are not as I advocated identical with their representations in the brain. So you could assume that there has to be in addition a nonphysical entity that creates the subjective experience on the basis of what is in the brain. Accordingly it would otherwise be a Zombie's brain (= an apparently living being completely devoid of subjective experience).

Philosophers have often argued that the assumption of such a nonphysical entity that is somehow thought to interact with the physical world creates a heavy problem: Namely that it would be inconceivable how physical and nonphysical entities interacted. It's no problem to imagine that a soul reacts on each brain content immediately, or with a short delay. But exactly how this should be working, a real interaction, isn't conceivable.

Nowadays we could perhaps point to nonlocal quantum effects to indicate that the idea of mechanistical causes and effects as the only possible interactions is maybe outdated.

I think there's indeed a serious problem in the materialistic theory I described and supported so far in this thread.
It's the question of how we are to explain our personal continuity. If we suppose that we are identical with our brains, then we're existing as long as the brain does exist. Superficially this seems to be a very clear case... But if we are very particular, then it isn't clear at all why my brain right now should be the very same object as my brain at any time in the future or past. First of all because there is no such thing as a material continuity, in the strict sense. An atom consists of the nucleus and some electrons. Electrons are not existing as the small, point-shaped, firm objects they are usually depicted as. They are more like a cloud of probabilities. And the nucleus consists of protons and neutrons, which in turn consist of quarks and gluons, and they get destroyed and reformed each 10^-23 seconds. So each 10^-23 seconds our substance has in fact changed.
Now we could disregard the substance and turn our attention to the shape, the structure, the pattern and the properties of the brain. But obviously this is changing as well during one's lifetime. Not as fast as the substance, and once one has reached a certain age, the further changes remain only minor, but still there are small changes, and of course there were much bigger ones at the earlier ages.
So how else could we explain the personal continuity?

Further, you could also question my explanation of the already mentioned unification problem, because the comparison of a unified mind's stream of consciousness with the running of a PC game isn’t quite perfect. It is us who regard a game as unified because we perceive it with our unified minds. But it can be questioned that the running of a game is per se a natural unit.

[Tautalos]

waldm said:

tautalos said:

Then again, all the material sensations and conceptions are part of that dream. Including all your conceptions about what you think that thinks, i.e., the brain.

Yes, but this doesn't invalidate the arguments in favour of such a concept, does it?

I think it invalidates that concept as a materialist argument.

the brain is the material support of thought. it is not the origin of all thought.
It's the hardware of the mind, so to speak.
It was not an exact analogy,
such software is before and above the hardware.

The problem is that this all sounds very vague. Perhaps you've got a clearer idea of what you mean,

What I mean is that the brain can be the material receptor of a non material principle, because, in this sphere of existence, the spiritual things need material things to «encarnate».

Why?

Because thought can't be touched, seen, tasted, heared, etc..

If you're agreeing that they are in the brain, then we already agree on much.

Yes. But the fact that they are in the brain, and that they can be subjectively experienced, does not mean that they don't correspond to something existing outside the brain, obviously.

Can you elaborate a little on that difference? I don't quite understand what you mean.

Explained above.

I don't even believe that they are red now... They've got a certain physical property that causes us to have a red impression if they are lighted properly and if the rays of light that were reflected at them come in contact with our eyes (and if the brain works correctly etc). We even cannot know that our individual impressions of red are identical to each other.

But you can see the red and I can see the red as well, in the same objects that you see the red. That's for sure.
So, I can't see any argument against the existence of red outside our brains.

If visual perception worked that way... why do our brains have a visual centre at their backside? It has been proven that if these areas are destroyed by an accident or by illness, then blindness is the consequence, even if the eyes are still fully in function. How would you explain this fact if a perception of red worked like that there is a red impression in front of the eyes and an immaterial mind that measures it by merely looking through these eyes?

I can't understand this. Would you say that things cease to exist just because we can't see them due to a problem of ours?

Yes, there are many, like radioactivity or UV- or infrared light etc.

They can be felt, or, at least, their effects can be physically felt. Also, there are devices capable of measuring such things. Now, the only way that humans can use such devices is through senses.

tautalos said:

All the impressions that a brain can fabricate under the effect of drugs, are still part of the material world, even if understood in a distorted way.

I'm not sure if I understand you right. I would agree if you by "are part of the material world" just mean that the impressions are physical states of the brain.

Those impressions concern material sensations.

[Tautalos]

waldm said:

Tautalos, what you absolutely could speculate is that the subjective impressions are not as I advocated identical with their representations in the brain.

What I'm saying is that those subjective impressions are nothing more than receptive states of the mind concerning what is outside the mind.

Philosophers have often argued that the assumption of such a nonphysical entity that is somehow thought to interact with the physical world creates a heavy problem: Namely that it would be inconceivable how physical and nonphysical entities interacted.

As if the spiritual entity acted as a sort of radiation, pervading the material objects.

[siciliano33]

How are "we" the brain, when the brain is an outer perception of "I" ? "I' is a different reality and entity then the brain, cuz it's above the brain, we know the brain, we perceive it. We are not the brain, we are this "I", thats the soul
Imo

[Liquid Len]

tautalos said:

I think it invalidates that concept as a materialist argument.

When I'm thinking that my sensory experience is like in a dream, then my view of my sensory experience changes a lot. But my view of my logical reasoning (and also of my feeling etc) doesn't change. Because everyone believes already that what one thinks and feels is in onesself, and not coming from the outside world. So you really can't say that the above quoted observation does invalidate my arguments in favour of a materialistic concept. And that it is a materialistic concept I was supporting, I 'm not denying.

tautalos said:

What I mean is that the brain can be the material receptor of a non material principle, because, in this sphere of existence, the spiritual things need material things to «encarnate».

Still much too vague. What is the function of the nonmaterial principle? What does it do?

For example, there are quite a few things that just can't be in its assignment. From people with strokes we know that each local stroke can lead to the loss of specific mental abilities, e.g. the recognizing of movements, of colours, of shapes, of faces, of positions in space and time, of the emotional context, while all other abilities are still there; if there's a stroke in the language centre, then the patient can still hear everything perfectly, but the words have lost all meaning to him - etc, there are many more cases. Therefore we can be sure that all mental faculties are faculties of the brain.

By the way, in my last post I already wrote what exactly could in fact be the task of a nonmaterial principle. I even mentioned some arguments that speak for its existence.

tautalos said:

Because thought can't be touched, seen, tasted, heared, etc..

If it's in the brain, as you conceded, it could in theory be touched, seen and tasted (heard not). (But of course only in the restricted way everything else can be touched, seen, etc., i.e. by having ones senses interact with it in order to get a subjective impression. Thus, you could observe your own brain with a camera or with mirrors, if you were undergoing a brain surgery.) The difference between this aspect of a thought to what our own thoughts are normally like in our experience can be explained as a difference in the perspective, i.e. between having a thought oneself and seeing the thought in another's brain.

tautalos said:

But you can see the red and I can see the red as well, in the same objects that you see the red.

We both call it red, that's for sure, but how do we want to know that our reds feel the same? I don't see your impression of "red", you don't see mine. What's really identical is the physical object we're referring to, its light reflecting properties and the wave length of the reflected light.

tautalos said:

So, I can't see any argument against the existence of red outside our brains.

I've already mentioned some.

tautalos said:

I can't understand this. Would you say that things cease to exist just because we can't see them due to a problem of ours?

No, I wouldn't, as the physical objects and their properties (which I obviously distinguish from the red experience) remain the same. But now I've refuted your idea that seeing is simply accomplished by a mind looking through the eyes. You brought that in order to avoid the problem of the infinite regress regarding the homunculus in the head.

tautalos said:

They can be felt, or, at least, their effects can be physically felt. Also, there are devices capable of measuring such things. Now, the only way that humans can use such devices is through senses.

Yeah, I knew this already, but you see, that's not quite the same as directly measuring them by the senses. Anyway, it's not important to our debate.

tautalos said:

Those impressions concern material sensations.

I still don't understand you any better. Material sensations - do you mean sensations which are material or sensations of the material world? My proposals and the answers to them remain exactly the same as before.

tautalos said:

What I'm saying is that those subjective impressions are nothing more than receptive states of the mind concerning what is outside the mind.

This completely misses the point of the sentence you quoted. The point is the question whether such things like an impression of red, a feeling of hunger, a feeling of hate or love, the taste of ale on the tongue, the sound of a flute in my ear, or the subjective experience of having a thought like "fish" are in fact identical with ( = are!!) states of my brain, or not. On the first page of this thread I advocated the opinion that they are identical. Now I conceded that they could also be different, and brought some arguments in favour of that. I suppose you would have always said that, though I'm not quite sure.

As to your sentence I quoted: When you're having a subjective impression in a dream it's certainly not a reflection of what is outside, because you're not using your senses then. You could speculate that these dream impressions are just memories. But in my experience mere memories can never feel as intense and real as a dream, which can, as I said, feel as intense and real as the perception of the real world.

tautalos said:

As if the spiritual entity acted as a sort of radiation, pervading the material objects.

This doesn't solve the problem, because all radiation is physical.

[Liquid Len]

abdallah said:

How are "we" the brain, when the brain is an outer perception of "I" ? "I' is a different reality and entity then the brain, cuz it's above the brain, we know the brain, we perceive it.

Normally we don't perceive our brains, though. But it's possible, of course.

The point is: What we perceive as our brain is not really our brain, but a picture in our mind.

[alaina]

Liquid Len,

What you have described is a representationalist account of materialism. Do you feel that account can escape skepticsm? If so, how? If representations of the external world are the immediate object of our awareness, how can we be sure we have knowledge of the external world?

[Liquid Len]

alaina said:

Do you feel that account can escape skepticsm? If so, how? If representations of the external world are the immediate object of our awareness, how can we be sure we have knowledge of the external world?

First of all there's the question of plausibility, as I wrote:

waldm said:

Imagine that you have to undergo a risky brain surgery. And due to bad luck it isn't all that successful, for some important structures in your brain get destroyed. As a consequence you'll be mentally handicapped for the rest of your life. That's a realistic scenario that could take place, in theory. How plausible is it that it takes place without there being a brain?

Or, as someone else mentioned in another forum:

All events and experiences in real life have direct consequences, no matter how big or small, even if nearly unperceivable, on subsequent events on life. This does not happen with "virtual events".

But this doesn't enable us to be 100% sure.

Secondly: I personally like the contextualistic approach to skepticism and knowledge. Have you heard of it?

[alaina]

Yes, I've heard of it. Are you familiar with David Annis?

I'm actually taking an upper level epistemology class right now. Contextualism was one of the topics, but I chose something else.

[Tautalos]

waldm said:

tautalos said:

I think it invalidates that concept as a materialist argument.

When I'm thinking that my sensory experience is like in a dream, then my view of my sensory experience changes a lot. But my view of my logical reasoning (and also of my feeling etc) doesn't change. Because everyone believes already that what one thinks and feels is in onesself, and not coming from the outside world. So you really can't say that the above quoted observation does invalidate

Yes, I can, because even if what one think and feels does not come from outside (I would like to know why not, by the way), that does not mean at all that it must have a material origin.

What is the function of the nonmaterial principle? What does it do?

We can't know it all, because we are just human. But, one way or another, I don't think that the nonmaterial principle haves to have a function. It just exists. It's the core of our existence in itself.
Thus, it's the material principle that haves a function.

From people with strokes we know that each local stroke can lead to the loss of specific mental abilities, e.g. the recognizing of movements, of colours, of shapes, of faces, of positions in space and time,

Just tools of the mind.

of the emotional context, while all other abilities are still there; if there's a stroke in the language centre, then the patient can still hear everything perfectly, but the words have lost all meaning to him - etc, there are many more cases. Therefore we can be sure that all mental faculties are faculties of the brain.

No, we cannot. I repeat: the ultimate root of the spiritual aspects of the mind are not material, for the thought itself is not material. The abilities that you spoke of are in the brain, but the brain can be just a door for it's manifestation in the material world. Once that door is damaged, the non material principle cannot act through it.
Again, the brain can be nothing more than a receiving device.

By the way, in my last post I already wrote what exactly could in fact be the task of a nonmaterial principle. I even mentioned some arguments that speak for its existence.

Explain it more precisely.

If it's in the brain, as you conceded, it could in theory be touched, seen and tasted

And, indeed, it can't be touched, seen or tasted. Or heard. Therefore, it is evident that not all that exists in the brain is material. The brain is just the less material part of the body, thus, a privileged door between the material and the non material.

That's not saying that the brain is the only half spiritual part of the body. Indeed, one can say that the spirit pervades literally all the aspects of the material world as we can sense it, because in everything there is a principle of quality, and the very idea of quality is in itself non material, contrary to quantity.

Now, who can deal with pure matter, without any quality, in the physical immediate world? Can someone touch matter in itself?

No. Only material concrete things can be touched, and all those material things of our world have a given form, which indicate the presence of a non material principle, of a quality.

We both call it red, that's for sure,

And that's more than enough to consider it as a quality that exists outside us.

but how do we want to know that our reds feel the same?

That's another subject alltogether. That's a matter of subjective impression, i.e., of the interference of the self in the process of knowing the outside world, which is part of what make all of us to be different from one another.

Thus, an existing thing is not just our own subjective impression of that thing. It exists, wether we know/want it or not.

Meanwhile, it is widely known that the red haves similar meanings in most if not all the cultures: action, violence, energy, war, passion, etc..

I don't see your impression of "red", you don't see mine. What's really identical is the physical object we're referring to, its light reflecting properties and the wave length of the reflected light.

Which is similar enough in both of us to make it clear that it is the same thing that we see. And it is outside of us.

I've already mentioned some.

Which were not valid.

No, I wouldn't, as the physical objects and their properties (which I obviously distinguish from the red experience) remain the same.

So, why not the red?
Also, if you admit the existence of the physical objects outside of us, what is, precisely, the basis of your argument?

But now I've refuted your idea that seeing is simply accomplished by a mind looking through the eyes. You brought that in order to avoid the problem of the infinite regress regarding the homunculus in the head.

Frankly, I don't see how did you refute my idea, as I am not sure of understanding the metaphor of the homunculus in the head.

Yeah, I knew this already, but you see, that's not quite the same as directly measuring them by the senses.

But it is something that belongs to the material world and that can be felt and analysed by material observation (either body senses of machine «senses»).

Anyway, it's not important to our debate.

It is, as a metaphor.

Material sensations - do you mean sensations which are material or sensations of the material world?

Sensations of the material world.

The point is the question whether such things like an impression of red, a feeling of hunger, a feeling of hate or love, the taste of ale on the tongue, the sound of a flute in my ear, or the subjective experience of having a thought like "fish" are in fact identical with ( = are!!) states of my brain, or not.

Of course they are. What I am saying is that all those impressions are not just material; and, specially concerned the feeling of hate or love, that's totally non material. Yes, they exist in the brain, but that does not mean that they are entirely produced by the grey matter that composes peoples' brains.

On the first page of this thread I advocated the opinion that they are identical. Now I conceded that they could also be different, and brought some arguments in favour of that.

You are referring the difference between having subjective impressions and having a brain of a machine, right?

As to your sentence I quoted: When you're having a subjective impression in a dream it's certainly not a reflection of what is outside, because you're not using your senses then.

It is, because I am using the memory of what my senses felt when I was not sleeping.

You could speculate that these dream impressions are just memories. But in my experience mere memories can never feel as intense and real as a dream, which can, as I said, feel as intense and real as the perception of the real world.

Maybe because the brain is acting over the memories in a different way than it happens when the brain is not sleeping. I've heard, from people who study Psychology, that, during the dreams, the normal mind is somehow similar to the schizophrenic mind - it produces a different reality in the mind, which, nevertheless, is never as real as reality, since what happens in the dreams can not change matter.

tautalos said:

As if the spiritual entity acted as a sort of radiation, pervading the material objects.

This doesn't solve the problem, because all radiation is physical.

Of course it is pysicall. The radiation is just a metaphor, or, at best, a near-comparison, but not an exact equivalent, since there is a clear difference between matter and spirit.

[Liquid Len]

tautalos said:

Yes, I can, because even if what one think and feels does not come from outside (I would like to know why not, by the way), that does not mean at all that it must have a material origin.

Did I say something else? Even if everything does not come from outside that doesn't prove that it must have a material origin! I have made that clear several times now.

tautalos said:

We can't know it all, because we are just human.

If you really had no idea then it would be pointless to make an argument with it. But however, you do have an idea of its function:

tautalos said:

It's the core of our existence in itself.

So, then it's what defines our identity. That is already a function. And fine, that's indeed possible. But I wrote already that it's maybe even impossible for materialist science to explain our personal continuity. And if it can't be explained physically, then it seems reasonable to explain it with something else.

tautalos said:

I repeat: the ultimate root of the spiritual aspects of the mind are not material, for the thought itself is not material.

You were not able to prove it, though.

tautalos said:

The abilities that you spoke of are in the brain, but the brain can be just a door for it's manifestation in the material world. Once that door is damaged, the non material principle cannot act through it.
Again, the brain can be nothing more than a receiving device.

That's extremely contradictory. Either the abilities are in the brain, i.e. they are the brain's abilities, or the brain is just a receiving device, receiving whatever the non material principle thought, planned, understood, decided etc. Can you make up your mind?
After having read what you wrote further below, I suppose you mean that the abilities are really the mind's abilities and only "in the brain" as far as the non physical mind is in your opinion in the brain...
I think this has been falsified. If certain brain structures are damaged, then that mental function is really lost. According to your theory the mental function should still be fully there and the patient should only have problems to show his/her abilities. E.g. a patient who doesn't understand language anymore should in your theory either be deaf, or having an articulation problem. But that isn't the case.

tautalos said:

Explain it more precisely.

More precisely? Noway.
But I can sum it up for you:

The assumption of a nonmaterial principle could be necessary to explain:

1. The personal continuity, i.e. how what I am persists through time.
2. The unity of consciousness. See also my first post of this thread.

A further of its tasks could be to translate brain contents into subjective experiences, if these were not just two aspects of the same thing.

tautalos said:

And, indeed, it can't be touched, seen or tasted.

Prove it.
A thought doesn't have any sense organs (neither does the brain have), so your thought wouldn't feel if it was being touched.

tautalos said:

Therefore, it is evident that not all that exists in the brain is material.

Something nonphysical isn't spatial. If a thought is nonphysical, you can't say that it's in the brain, because it's nowhere in the physical world. It isn't part of the physical universe, by definition.

tautalos said:

in everything there is a principle of quality, and the very idea of quality is in itself non material, contrary to quantity.
Now, who can deal with pure matter, without any quality, in the physical immediate world? Can someone touch matter in itself?
No. Only material concrete things can be touched, and all those material things of our world have a given form, which indicate the presence of a non material principle, of a quality.

That's an ontological question, and it's arguable. You could, like Aristotle or Platon say that every physical object is a combination of pure substance and qualities. Or you could say that physical objects are nothing more than bundles of qualities, which would be a more empiristically inspired view. Or you could say that any material content of any spacetime area is a physical object...

Some doubts against your view: Can there really be a substance without qualities? Isn't the talk of the "having of qualities" purely metaphorical? If you abstract in your mind the qualities of an object, you don't really take them away. And can there be a physical substance that doesn't change? The Heracliteans for example said there is no such thing.

tautalos said:

That's another subject alltogether. That's a matter of subjective impression, i.e., of the interference of the self in the process of knowing the outside world, which is part of what make all of us to be different from one another.

So when you're saying "this object here is red" you don't want to say that it has your red impression as a quality? In that case we'd be merely using the term red differently. By red you would mean the physical property of the object, while I mean the experienced colour, and the argument would be settled. But honestly, I don't believe you if you're claiming that you always used it like that. In your second newest post you said for instance:

tautalos said:

But you can see the red and I can see the red as well, in the same objects that you see the red. That's for sure.

If red is the thing we see, then it is the subjectively experienced colour! This is at least what I see. Or do you mean something else with "seeing"?

tautalos said:

Thus, an existing thing is not just our own subjective impression of that thing. It exists, wether we know/want it or not.

I never said otherwise. Don't create strawmen please.

waldm said:

What's really identical is the physical object we're referring to, its light reflecting properties and the wave length of the reflected light.

tautalos said:

Which is similar enough in both of us to make it clear that it is the same thing that we see. And it is outside of us.

It depends a lot on what you mean with "seeing". If seeing is the subjective experience, then it doesn't make this clear.

tautalos said:

So, why not the red?

If the red for you really isn't the subjective experience, but the physical property of the physical object, then it is also the red; to you.

tautalos said:

Also, if you admit the existence of the physical objects outside of us, what is, precisely, the basis of your argument?

Which argument do you mean??? The point of the whole? My first post of this thread can obviously be seen as a plea for a materialistic world view. That was actually the point of it. And as it is essential for materialism to assume the existence of matter, and hence of physical objects outside of us, the doubting of these things surely was never the basis of the argument as a whole. The function of the skeptical questions in the beginning was rather to undermine the typical, often heard anti-materialistic arguments, right in the beginning. Such a typical argument would be for example: "But I know what the mind is, because I experience mind, and I am sure, it is entirely different from what I experience as physical. So they must be two different things."

tautalos said:

Frankly, I don't see how did you refute my idea, as I am not sure of understanding the metaphor of the homunculus in the head.

First of all, you don't have to understand this metaphor in order to see that I refuted your idea. But I'll recapitulate it for you:

We wanted to explain how our seeing of red is accomplished. If we think (like you seemed to suggest) that we look through the eyes at the red impression outside of the body, as if the eyes were two little windows, it follows that we are someone in our head who's looking through two windows. But what is actually the meaning of someone looking through a window? =>We're right at the beginning again. Because what we wanted to explain was the question of how our seeing is accomplished. Therefore we find ourselves in an infinite regress. The seeing of the persons we are is explained by the seeing of someone in our head, and because this doesn't solve the problem, this person's seeing has again to be explained by someone else's seeing etc, without an end.

Now you came with an alternative explanation of seeing. Namely that the mind simply realizes that there is red in front of the eyes.

So, in your theory, what is needed to see red is:
1. Functioning eyes.
2. A mind that makes use of the eyes.

But this has been clearly refuted, because there are people with functoning eyes, and with a mind, who are nonetheless blind.

tautalos said:

But it is something that belongs to the material world and that can be felt and analysed by material observation (either body senses of machine «senses»).

So what?
And besides: Radioactivity can't be felt. It's destructive effects on the body can be felt, but not radioactivity itself.

waldm said:

Anyway, it's not important to our debate.

tautalos said:

It is, as a metaphor.

waldm said:

Material sensations - do you mean sensations which are material or sensations of the material world?

tautalos said:

Sensations of the material world.

I already answered that. Some hallucinations are not sensations of the material world, that's just a fact. I can get you some links to reports of drug users if you're interested. Some drugs are that strong you don't even have to close your eyes in order to see non-sensational hallucinations.

tautalos said:

Of course they are. What I am saying is that all those impressions are not just material; and, specially concerned the feeling of hate or love, that's totally non material. Yes, they exist in the brain, but that does not mean that they are entirely produced by the grey matter that composes peoples' brains.

OK, so, as I thought, basically you say that they are not identical with states of the brain. You just change the definitions a little, which can lead to confusion, and which isn't necessary, but you can do it anyway. By "brain states" I normally mean states of the physical object called brain.

waldm said:

On the first page of this thread I advocated the opinion that they are identical. Now I conceded that they could also be different, and brought some arguments in favour of that.

tautalos said:

You are referring the difference between having subjective impressions and having a brain of a machine, right?

Not in the line you quoted, though.
It isn't really a proof.

tautalos said:

It is, because I am using the memory of what my senses felt when I was not sleeping.

waldm said:

You could speculate that these dream impressions are just memories. But in my experience mere memories can never feel as intense and real as a dream, which can, as I said, feel as intense and real as the perception of the real world.

tautalos said:

Maybe because the brain is acting over the memories in a different way than it happens when the brain is not sleeping.

OK, memory wasn't probably the right word. It's clear that the brain must have had sensory impressions in order to have dreams that are making use of such impressions. So you could call it memory, because the brain had to learn it. But the point is more the difference between a visual idea when you're awake and the dream impressions. A visual idea can be a memory, that's why I first used the term memory, while I better should have called it visual idea. It is a picture in your mind you consciously and actively form. You have to struggle and concentrate yourself to make it as intense as possible, and still it always remains hazy and weak, it's in any case just a poor imitation of a real experience, or of the original one, if we're talking about memories. Most people think that dreams are poor imitations too. That's because they're never really conscious and attentive in their dreams. So they conclude that only sensory perceptions of the real world can lead to a real feeling experience. But some people have lucid dreams from time to time; that's when the dreamer knows that he is dreaming. That means he has the full consciousness of the awake life while dreaming. I've had several times such experiences, and one time I turned my attention to the perception during the dream. I observed and analyzed my "sensory" experience in the dream with the fullest awareness and intensity possible. And that means with more awareness than during most of the time in awake life... It was an extraordinary, remarkable experience, psychedelic in the truest sense of the word. I realised that there was no difference. The "sensory" experience felt exactly as real as reality. I've seen with my "virtual" (dreamed) eyes, as if they had been my real eyes. For me there was only one conclusion: If they feel exactly the same, the awake perception can't be a completely different thing, can't be completely differently working, so it must be too something emerging in myself. If there can be such a world in my head, completely independent of my sense organs - then there's no need to assume that the impression of the real world is something emerging outside of me.
Now, I know that it looks like a weak point that I've had to have a lucid dream in order to see this, since not everybody has a lucid dream and certainly not when they need one. But: In fact, powerful psychedelic drugs (LSD, or even better: Ayahuasca combined with DMT) can enable exactly the same amazing experience. Unfortunately most people who had such trips make the wrong conclusions. Instead of realizing that it's all fake, all perception, regardless whether awake or dream or drug, they say exactly the opposite: It's all real and true. Thus, they think the hallucinated realities are as real or even more real than the ordinary reality.

tautalos said:

Of course it is pysicall. The radiation is just a metaphor, or, at best, a near-comparison, but not an exact equivalent, since there is a clear difference between matter and spirit.

But then it can't make the interaction clearer.

[Liquid Len]

alaina said:

Are you familiar with David Annis?

No, doesn't seem familiar to me.

[Tautalos]

waldm said:

tautalos said:

Yes, I can, because even if what one think and feels does not come from outside (I would like to know why not, by the way), that does not mean at all that it must have a material origin.

Did I say something else? Even if everything does not come from outside that doesn't prove that it must have a material origin!

All right. That's one of my main points. So, the original argument, of the first post, is refuted.

So, then it's what defines our identity. That is already a function.

I don't see it as a function, because the existence itself is not a function, but something served by all the functions.

But I wrote already that it's maybe even impossible for materialist science to explain our personal continuity.

I understood it, basically, but I would like to get a more precise explanation.

You were not able to prove it, though.

Is it necessary to prove that the thought does not have weight?

That's extremely contradictory. Either the abilities are in the brain, i.e. they are the brain's abilities,

No. I did not contradict myself. When I said that the abilities are in the brain, that mean that those abilities are functions to serve the spirit, i.e., the non material principle. Tools for the mind.

After having read what you wrote further below, I suppose you mean that the abilities are really the mind's abilities and only "in the brain" as far as the non physical mind is in your opinion in the brain...
I think this has been falsified. If certain brain structures are damaged, then that mental function is really lost. According to your theory the mental function should still be fully there and the patient should only have problems to show his/her abilities. E.g. a patient who doesn't understand language anymore should in your theory either be deaf, or having an articulation problem. But that isn't the case.

Yes, it can be the case, but a more deeper level. His spirit can still be there, but without being able to manifest it's real will. I.e., that «door» between the non material upper world and the material world is closed.





And, indeed, it can't be touched, seen or tasted.

Prove it.

Could anyone ever touch, seen or tasted a thought?

A thought doesn't have any sense organs (neither does the brain have),

But a brain can be touched. A thought, cannot.

Something nonphysical isn't spatial. If a thought is nonphysical, you can't say that it's in the brain,

Saying that it is in the brain, is not the same that saying that it is produced by the brain alone. It is in the brain (where else could it be?) but as a «passenger».

And yes, the thought is not spatial.

That's an ontological question,

All this discussion is ontological since the first post.

and it's arguable.

Like everything else. Even existence itself is arguable...

You could, like Aristotle or Platon say that every physical object is a combination of pure substance and qualities.

That's my point.

Or you could say that any material content of any spacetime area is a physical object...

Agreed.

Some doubts against your view: Can there really be a substance without qualities?

It's not against my view.

Isn't the talk of the "having of qualities" purely metaphorical? If you abstract in your mind the qualities of an object, you don't really take them away.

Precisely. That shows that we cannot touch pure matter devoid of quality.
So, we are, as a principle, essentially spiritual beings.

So when you're saying "this object here is red" you don't want to say that it has your red impression as a quality?

No. I just say that it haves a quality of red and that it produces an impression of red in me.

By red you would mean the physical property of the object,

That's right. It exists wether we exist or not.

But honestly, I don't believe you if you're claiming that you always used it like that.

Tell the reason.

If red is the thing we see, then it is the subjectively experienced colour!

Of course it is. It is both. Both the subjectively experienced colour and the quality of the object as well. It is the experienced colour that is a consequence of the quality of the object. So, things exist beyond or own existence or knowledge.


Thus, an existing thing is not just our own subjective impression of that thing. It exists, wether we know/want it or not.

I never said otherwise.

You apparently did, when you said that you were not sure if red exists.



Which is similar enough in both of us to make it clear that it is the same thing that we see. And it is outside of us.

It depends a lot on what you mean with "seeing". If seeing is the subjective experience, then it doesn't make this clear.

Seeing is watching with the eyes. A mechanical process that produces subjective experiences, slightly or greatly different, but with the same root.

Which argument do you mean??? The point of the whole?

Your materialist argument right now.

My first post of this thread can obviously be seen as a plea for a materialistic world view. That was actually the point of it. And as it is essential for materialism to assume the existence of matter, and hence of physical objects outside of us, the doubting of these things surely was never the basis of the argument as a whole. The function of the skeptical questions in the beginning was rather to undermine the typical, often heard anti-materialistic arguments, right in the beginning. Such a typical argument would be for example: "But I know what the mind is, because I experience mind, and I am sure, it is entirely different from what I experience as physical. So they must be two different things."

I see. And that argument turned out to be anti-materialistic, because the only thing that we can be sure of is of our own non material existence (the thought).

We wanted to explain how our seeing of red is accomplished. If we think (like you seemed to suggest) that we look through the eyes at the red impression outside of the body, as if the eyes were two little windows, it follows that we are someone in our head who's looking through two windows. But what is actually the meaning of someone looking through a window? =>We're right at the beginning again. Because what we wanted to explain was the question of how our seeing is accomplished.

You could not present any argument against the possibility that the eyes are just the tool of the body that serve the brain as a source of information concerning the outside world. Yes, like windows. Windows for the inteligent part of human body, that work as a door between the material and the non material reality.

So, in your theory, what is needed to see red is:
1. Functioning eyes.
2. A mind that makes use of the eyes.

But this has been clearly refuted, because there are people with functoning eyes, and with a mind, who are nonetheless blind.

It has not been refuted, because that blindness haves a material origin, if not in the eyes, then in the brain, at a material level, obviously.

And besides: Radioactivity can't be felt. It's destructive effects on the body can be felt, but not radioactivity itself.

But it can be analized through material mechanisms, that work like artificial senses. So, it belongs fully to the material world. But, due that quality of not being visible or felt, it is a rather good metaphor for the spiritual reality.

I already answered that. Some hallucinations are not sensations of the material world,

Yes, they are, in a way, since they can only be felt by a person who had already felt them pysically. The brain can only use what it already know from the experience of the material world.

I can get you some links to reports of drug users if you're interested. Some drugs are that strong you don't even have to close your eyes in order to see non-sensational hallucinations.

The only thing that that proves is that drugs can act as a form of activating memories.

OK, so, as I thought, basically you say that they are not identical with states of the brain.

Well, they can also be states of the brain. But some thoughts are not able to be reduced to that.

You just change the definitions a little,

There must be some misunderstanding, because I did not change nothing.

OK, memory wasn't probably the right word. It's clear that the brain must have had sensory impressions in order to have dreams that are making use of such impressions. So you could call it memory, because the brain had to learn it. But the point is more the difference between a visual idea when you're awake and the dream impressions. A visual idea can be a memory, that's why I first used the term memory, while I better should have called it visual idea. It is a picture in your mind you consciously and actively form. You have to struggle and concentrate yourself to make it as intense as possible, and still it always remains hazy and weak, it's in any case just a poor imitation of a real experience, or of the original one, if we're talking about memories. Most people think that dreams are poor imitations too. That's because they're never really conscious and attentive in their dreams. So they conclude that only sensory perceptions of the real world can lead to a real feeling experience. But some people have lucid dreams from time to time; that's when the dreamer knows that he is dreaming. That means he has the full consciousness of the awake life while dreaming. I've had several times such experiences, and one time I turned my attention to the perception during the dream. I observed and analyzed my "sensory" experience in the dream with the fullest awareness and intensity possible. And that means with more awareness than during most of the time in awake life... It was an extraordinary, remarkable experience, psychedelic in the truest sense of the word. I realised that there was no difference. The "sensory" experience felt exactly as real as reality. I've seen with my "virtual" (dreamed) eyes, as if they had been my real eyes. For me there was only one conclusion: If they feel exactly the same, the awake perception can't be a completely different thing, can't be completely differently working, so it must be too something emerging in myself. If there can be such a world in my head, completely independent of my sense organs - then there's no need to assume that the impression of the real world is something emerging outside of me.
Now, I know that it looks like a weak point that I've had to have a lucid dream in order to see this, since not everybody has a lucid dream and certainly not when they need one. But: In fact, powerful psychedelic drugs (LSD, or even better: Ayahuasca combined with DMT) can enable exactly the same amazing experience. Unfortunately most people who had such trips make the wrong conclusions. Instead of realizing that it's all fake, all perception, regardless whether awake or dream or drug, they say exactly the opposite: It's all real and true. Thus, they think the hallucinated realities are as real or even more real than the ordinary reality.

All I wish to say in this case is that such brain power can indeed be a hint that the brain is capable of an extra-physical perception - again, a door, or a ladder towards the non physical. There is perhaps some true in some experiences with some drugs. It is known that ancient Shamans used them in order to reach higher states of existence.

Maybe the drugs have the power to activate hidden powers in the brain. For example, it is known that LSD creates a sort of confusion in the senses: people that consume it often see sounds and touch colours. It seems like pure illusion, or madness; however, I had a girlfriend, who did never take drugs, that could feel colours just by touching objects. We tested it once, and, out of ten, she did it seven times. She said that she feels red, blue, green, etc.. There was not special effort, since she claims to do it everyday, when she picks nail polish little bottles out of her bag (and yes, those little bottles have same shapes and different colours, so there was no way for her to make an association of shape-colour).

tautalos said:

Of course it is physicall. The radiation is just a metaphor, or, at best, a near-comparison, but not an exact equivalent, since there is a clear difference between matter and spirit.

But then it can't make the interaction clearer.

It just gives an idea that it is possible that something not touchable can pervade things.

[pegasos]

Thoughts are material, or not?

Since thoughts can have an effect on the thinker's or another's material body, then we can assume that thoughts, mind projections are matter in a lighter form. There is a scale.

The same may be true for the Soul.

What we dont see, is not necessarily non existent.

Is the soul an invisible harmony that balances the material being? Or a lighter, purer form of matter?

[Liquid Len]

tautalos said:

All right. That's one of my main points. So, the original argument, of the first post, is refuted.

NO, it isn't! Or what exactly do you mean with "the original argument of the first post"

I just didn't ever say "it doesn't come from outside, hence it must have a material origin". I never claimed anything like this.

Brought on two lines, my argument has to be be seen exactly like this:

1. We don't know the world, we don't know ourselves. All we know are our own subjective states.
(From hence only skepticism follows.)

By the way, that's exactly the same as Kant wrote.
He didn't argue with drugs and dreams, though. He simply stated that our perceptions must be states of ourselves, because if they were something outside of ourselves, we wouldn't have them (they wouldn't be part of our consciousness).

2. Neuroscience indicates that there are brains and that the conscious states are states of these brains.
(From hence materialism follows.)

waldm said:

So, then it's what defines our identity. That is already a function.

tautalos said:

I don't see it as a function, because the existence itself is not a function, but something served by all the functions.

First of all, it's important to stress that this is a rather irrelevant point in this debate. (If we don't distinguish between important and unimportant points, the readers and finally ourselves could get problems in understanding what it is all about, and what my arguments are.)
Secondly, existence itself isn't of course a function, but it has a function, namely to define someones identity. If you imagine a crowded room, you can say it is a room full of conscious experiences. If you are part of this crowd, it is your identity that determines which ones of these experiences you fully experience, and which ones not at all (that's a big difference by the way). And what determines your identity? IMO simply the fact that you are exactly one of these persons - in other words your existence.

waldm said:

But I wrote already that it's maybe even impossible for materialist science to explain our personal continuity.

tautalos said:

I understood it, basically, but I would like to get a more precise explanation.

IMO we are subjects who have certain experiences. The experiences are constantly changing, obviously. But we believe that as long as we live, the subject of our experiences doesn't change. If it changed, our experiences wouldn't be our experiences anymore, but they would belong to someone else, to the other subject who would then own them. Theoretically it's possible that some of the things we remember having experienced, were really experienced by someone else, by another subject, and that only the memory of these things has been transmitted to the subject we are. If we are not our body, this would mean, that someone else might have had our body, perhaps until some years ago, and that what we remember as a large deal of our life was lived by someone else in this same body. Or, if we are our body, we could speculate that it isn't exactly the same body anymore (which is even true), and thus we could say that we are not identical with the person that this body was some years ago. But as I said, we don't believe such things, and furthermore it's also obvious that we're existing at least for a longer time than just a fraction of a second. Therefore we have to explain why and how the subject remains constantly the same, at least for a certain time, and possibly (as we believe) for the whole life as well. So we have to ask ourselves: What are the conditions under which two temporally seperated things are identical to each other (which would mean that they are the same thing)? Like the old Greeks we could (purely in theory) distinguish between substance and form. And we could say that if one or both of these components remains the same, the object remains the same object. Perhaps both of these components are important, perhaps only one of them, or perhaps one (either substance or form), is even irrelevant. In any case, if both components change, we cannot be dealing with the same object anymore. However, some might suggest, that a constant, continuous change of an object (in both components) might preserve the identity of that object. But imo that's nonsense and only seems somewhat plausible because we normally believe to see substantial continuity everywhere in the objects around us, therefore we subconsciously presuppose it every time we're imagining a continuing object. From here onwards the rest should be clear from what I wrote in the post above. Neither our form nor our physical substance remains constant, hence there must be something else that's remaining the same.

tautalos said:

Is it necessary to prove that the thought does not have weight?

Yes it is! Well, at least if you're claiming it.

Because, just remember my skeptical remarks: Do you know what your thought looks like from the outside? No, to find it out you would have to be another person staring at you, but then the thought wouldn't be your thought anymore, and you would have your own thoughts instead, but again only subjectively experienced, without knowing what they would look like from the outside... There's simply no way of getting out of yourself and looking back at you and your thoughts.

tautalos said:

No. I did not contradict myself. When I said that the abilities are in the brain, that mean that those abilities are functions to serve the spirit, i.e., the non material principle. Tools for the mind.

But then the brain is more than just a "receiving device"! A receiving device would be something like a TV set, for example.

tautalos said:

Yes, it can be the case, but a more deeper level. His spirit can still be there, but without being able to manifest it's real will. I.e., that «door» between the non material upper world and the material world is closed.

His consciousness can of course still be there, and that's usually easily verifiable.
But I'm not sure what you mean. Does he, in your opinion, understand the words or not? If he does so, how does your version differ from what I called "having an articulation problem"? If he doesn't, then we agree that the ability is really lost.

tautalos said:

Could anyone ever touch, seen or tasted a thought?

You were denying that it is possible, you have taken a position, so you have to prove it; and your simple question just isn't enough; I would answer: Perhaps. It heavily depends on what a thought is. And of your own thought you have only your subjective view, i.e. you can’t be sure that you know all aspects of it, you don’t know what it looks like from outside.

tautalos said:

It is in the brain (where else could it be?) but as a «passenger».
And yes, the thought is not spatial.

Being in the brain is a spatial relation. How can something nonspatial have a spatial relation with something? A point would be the smallest "object" that could have a spatial relation. Do you want to say that the mind has the shape of a point? Of a one-dimensional object? Does something nonspatial have a shape?

waldm said:

Or you could say that any material content of any spacetime area is a physical object...

tautalos said:

Agreed.

But this would mean: You could dissect the spacetime whatever way you like. The qualities don't distinguish one collection of matter from another one, and they don't define distinct objects.

waldm said:

Can there really be a substance without qualities?

tautalos said:

It's not against my view.

Didn't you say that the spirit has to pervade the material world in order there to be qualities? If qualitites are an inseparable aspect of every matter this would be superfluous.

waldm said:

Isn't the talk of the "having of qualities" purely metaphorical? If you abstract in your mind the qualities of an object, you don't really take them away.

tautalos said:

Precisely.

But again, if matter doesn't "have" qualities in the way someone might have a collection of stamps, if the qualitites are an inseparable aspect of matter, then it's nonsensical to presume that there has to be spirit pervading the material world because of the qualities.

tautalos said:

That shows that we cannot touch pure matter devoid of quality.
So, we are, as a principle, essentially spiritual beings.

That's a hilariously big leap.
We cannot touch pure matter devoid of quality could be the case simply because there cannot be matter devoid of quality.

tautalos said:

Of course it is. It is both. Both the subjectively experienced colour and the quality of the object as well. It is the experienced colour that is a consequence of the quality of the object.

It's at least misleading to call two very different things the same name.

tautalos said:

You apparently did, when you said that you were not sure if red exists.

I didn't doubt the existence of red. It's obvious that there are subjective impressions (no matter if different or identical) that we call red.
I said I don't believe that the things that induce us to have an impression of a red object have got the property of being red, and I still don't believe it. Contrary to you I don't call these different things the same.

tautalos said:

I see. And that argument turned out to be anti-materialistic, because the only thing that we can be sure of is of our own non material existence (the thought).

LOL
1. My materialistic plea wasn't meant to represent a 100% certainty.
2. Yes, you can be quite sure of your existence, but it still remains unclear why the thought should be nonmaterial, and how you can be that sure of it.

tautalos said:

You could not present any argument against the possibility that the eyes are just the tool of the body that serve the brain as a source of information concerning the outside world.

LOL
That's no surprise, because that's exactly what I think and also wrote.

tautalos said:

Yes, like windows. Windows for the inteligent part of human body, that work as a door between the material and the non material reality.

I don't know if you've finally got the point of the window metaphor.
And frankly, I don't care any longer.

tautalos said:

It has not been refuted, because that blindness haves a material origin, if not in the eyes, then in the brain, at a material level, obviously.

What hasn't been refuted? Exactly what I wrote has been refuted, and nothing else.
Now you're coming with something else that was never the topic of this sub-debate.

The whole thing started with my remark that

waldm said:

I think the impression "red" is in the brain, it isn't something out there that sticks at the objects.

Amongst many other things because of the regress involving the homunculus in the head.

Now we finally agree that there has to be a representation of red in the brain in order there to be an impression of red in the mind. Perhaps this representation is identical to the subjective impression (= the materialistic assumption), perhaps it isn't. But it should have become clear that the subjective impression isn't something out there that sticks at the objects.

tautalos said:

Yes, they are, in a way, since they can only be felt by a person who had already felt them pysically. The brain can only use what it already know from the experience of the material world.

I like to compare the brain, or the subject we are, with a musical instrument, like a guitar. The world is interacting with this instrument like a skillful hand. But the sounds (corresponding to the subjective experience) are produced by the guitar, by the strings, the hollow behind it and the air in it. In a dream it's a little bit different, then it's like a guitar that's playing by itself - but only the tones that have previously been played by a hand. But it's still the guitar that produces the sounds, as always.

tautalos said:

The only thing that that proves is that drugs can act as a form of activating memories.

Firstly: As I indicated, memories sounds much too restrictive to me. In drug trips you can experience all sorts of weird things and beings which you'll never experience in your normal life. The only things that can possibly (? but you mentioned cases of synaesthesis yourself) be compared or reduced to memories are the experienced qualia. Qualia is a philosophical terminus technicus for simple, nonlogical, nonreduceable "raw" feelings, which you always have to have experienced yourself in order to fully see them - like the often cited impression of red, the specific flavour of a banana, or the sound of a flute, etc. It's really like in my metaphor with the musical instrument: You can only experience the tones in which the guitar (the brain) is experienced, but out of these tones many great (or less great) musical pieces can be composed.

Secondly: Is there a subjective difference between a hallucinated memory and a not hallucinated experience? No, there isn't. And that's the point! The experiences are both produced in the same way, regardless of whether they're based on memories or sense inputs. You could say a memory is an information that has been saved in the brain. But as long as it's saved there it isn't a subjective experience. It can only become a subjective experience, if the brain constructs one.

tautalos said:

Well, they can also be states of the brain. But some thoughts are not able to be reduced to that.

Any examples?

tautalos said:

It just gives an idea that it is possible that something not touchable can pervade things.

Yeah, but the real problem is more the interaction between something really nonspatial and purely subjective with something that is nothing more than "res extensa" (as Descartes called matter).

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

@ pegasos

If there's such an unknown lighter form of matter would be a question that belongs to the realm of physics.

But I would rather ask you why thoughts have to be a lighter form of matter. Do you have any evidence in favour of that? Have we ever peeked at our thoughts from a position outside of ourselves?
And why can't a thought be the firing of neurons?