Post by Italianissimo on Nov 21, 2004 17:59:16 GMT -5
Free will has been characterized in such revelations as the Old Testament as a gift from God, an ability of mankind to choose and act as isolated atoms. Consequently, the burden of judgement has also befallen the tenets of OT-NT religion upon those atoms, deciding in the final judgement a reservation in heaven or hell; these implications have manifested themselves into secular notions that follow a "train of logic" instead of assuming a dependecy on divine revelation, yet remain directly parallel to each other, the latter rooted in the former. Much of philosophy, from Plato to modern philosophers such as Schopenhauer, has presupposed free will, or, in some cases, its polar opposite, absolute determination, better known as determinism, due to the numerous faults that result from the concept of free will.
To begin an appropriate inquiry into free will, one must first know its theory. According to Hobbes, the basic tenet of free will is choice. This assumes that in a given circumstance the options of action, rendered solely unto the subject whose act is in question, that is, a suspension of judgement pressed upon being, are limited to more than one particular decision. The multiplicity of choices is what sets being upon its recognition of free will, and thus to its supposed greatest good, freedom. For freedom allows being absolute determination over itself, and this has been the sought after utopia of our ages. Why, we may certainly ask, has this been so? With our shovels being struck into the soil and its head removing the outer layers (or cultural appearances), if such a thing be truly necessary, we find Christian roots constant in our culture, roots that flower the presuppositions of free will, good and evil, and other such themes of thought and discourse. Even under secular governments and anti-Christian movements led in philosophy by such powerful figures as Nietzsche and Sartre, the roots of Christianity continue to ferment, even without its absolute notion of God. Thus even with God's death, as Nietzsche vehemently anticipated, Christianity remains a driving force behind secular masks and 'objective' reasoning. Indeed, the blemish of Christianity absorbs much of yesterday's and today's underlying social and individual themes of thought. Though let this be the subject of a different report.
With the concept of free will and the experience of being has come the notion of responsibility, especially particular to Hume and his modern followers; Hume also subject to the Christian West, and thus its presupposed notions of being and the world. Responsibility is the idea, derived from free will, that being owns the consequences of its actions, for being originates its own acts. From this derives a multitude of disciplines, particularly morality and legal management of civil and criminal cases. The acts of being, rendered unto being in its circumstances, begin with an initial choice, and from that choice a chain of reactions, or a causality, initiated by that choice. In order to avoid negative consequences, negative to any particular host-subject, namely itself, being must assume responsibility for that choice, and thus the burden of its consequence. This theme is all too familiar, yet a multitude of paradoxes surround them, and even bring in necessary elements of determinism to relieve them. Per example, an example given by Roger Scruton in his book "Modern Philosophy", a driver has lost his breaks and, due to the vehicles particular course of direction, must crash into one of three things: a pub, an old man, or a group of children. Although this does not cancel free will, yet provides a case in point for it, responsibility would seemingly lie with the driver regardless of the outcome. Here we begin to see why determinism must come into play, in order to cancel out the choice of the being as the initial cause and replace it with the faulty brakes of the vehicle as being the culprit of the incident rather than being and its ability to choose a course of action, for the choice itself is a consequence of a situation that is in respect beyond the being pressed for a decision. From this we can clearly see the faults in the notion of responsibility, yet free will remains firmly intact. Or does it?
This leads us to our question: Does free will possess 'truth'? Philosophers such as Heidegger would say no. Free will is a lingual concept that dominates our way of thinking, yet is not always consistent with itself as a concept. What we can gather from the 'will' is not so much freedom, something that renders our decisions solely to us, but the ability to interact with our environment and subject-objects within it; that it has been turned into a universal concept is the fault of shortsightedness and a misunderstanding in an attempt to systematize something that cannot be systematized, being. This implies a notion proper to physics rather than religion and its sister philosphies, or an omnipresent 'freedom' that fails in cases particular to victimization from other sources, even non-human. This led Heidegger to reconsider the question of being in order to eliminate older concepts that have misdirected our perceptions of things, namely the battle between free will and determinism, a fruitless battle that ends up with both sides slain by the hands of Derrida's famous 'deconstruction'.
Can we make any conclusions? Free will is a metaphysical concept, a concept stemming from religion and ultimatley masked by secularist 'logic'. Yet the 'will' as a concept is not necessary, for its origins of explanation reside more securely in science, namely physics and the anatomy of the body that allows being the ability to act in the first place, and secondly the environment provided for being in which to interact; free will comes from our tongues and is a pre-scientific concept brough about by revelation rather than intimate study of being that is found in the human sciences. Our ability to reject the fantasies of metaphysics allows us a more real investigation of such concepts, and, ultimately, a more earthly conclusion.
My question to the audience is this; what is your own belief of the will and how is it justified? The essay has been left incomplete and with several possible holes, but this to provide for further debate, if necessary.
To begin an appropriate inquiry into free will, one must first know its theory. According to Hobbes, the basic tenet of free will is choice. This assumes that in a given circumstance the options of action, rendered solely unto the subject whose act is in question, that is, a suspension of judgement pressed upon being, are limited to more than one particular decision. The multiplicity of choices is what sets being upon its recognition of free will, and thus to its supposed greatest good, freedom. For freedom allows being absolute determination over itself, and this has been the sought after utopia of our ages. Why, we may certainly ask, has this been so? With our shovels being struck into the soil and its head removing the outer layers (or cultural appearances), if such a thing be truly necessary, we find Christian roots constant in our culture, roots that flower the presuppositions of free will, good and evil, and other such themes of thought and discourse. Even under secular governments and anti-Christian movements led in philosophy by such powerful figures as Nietzsche and Sartre, the roots of Christianity continue to ferment, even without its absolute notion of God. Thus even with God's death, as Nietzsche vehemently anticipated, Christianity remains a driving force behind secular masks and 'objective' reasoning. Indeed, the blemish of Christianity absorbs much of yesterday's and today's underlying social and individual themes of thought. Though let this be the subject of a different report.
With the concept of free will and the experience of being has come the notion of responsibility, especially particular to Hume and his modern followers; Hume also subject to the Christian West, and thus its presupposed notions of being and the world. Responsibility is the idea, derived from free will, that being owns the consequences of its actions, for being originates its own acts. From this derives a multitude of disciplines, particularly morality and legal management of civil and criminal cases. The acts of being, rendered unto being in its circumstances, begin with an initial choice, and from that choice a chain of reactions, or a causality, initiated by that choice. In order to avoid negative consequences, negative to any particular host-subject, namely itself, being must assume responsibility for that choice, and thus the burden of its consequence. This theme is all too familiar, yet a multitude of paradoxes surround them, and even bring in necessary elements of determinism to relieve them. Per example, an example given by Roger Scruton in his book "Modern Philosophy", a driver has lost his breaks and, due to the vehicles particular course of direction, must crash into one of three things: a pub, an old man, or a group of children. Although this does not cancel free will, yet provides a case in point for it, responsibility would seemingly lie with the driver regardless of the outcome. Here we begin to see why determinism must come into play, in order to cancel out the choice of the being as the initial cause and replace it with the faulty brakes of the vehicle as being the culprit of the incident rather than being and its ability to choose a course of action, for the choice itself is a consequence of a situation that is in respect beyond the being pressed for a decision. From this we can clearly see the faults in the notion of responsibility, yet free will remains firmly intact. Or does it?
This leads us to our question: Does free will possess 'truth'? Philosophers such as Heidegger would say no. Free will is a lingual concept that dominates our way of thinking, yet is not always consistent with itself as a concept. What we can gather from the 'will' is not so much freedom, something that renders our decisions solely to us, but the ability to interact with our environment and subject-objects within it; that it has been turned into a universal concept is the fault of shortsightedness and a misunderstanding in an attempt to systematize something that cannot be systematized, being. This implies a notion proper to physics rather than religion and its sister philosphies, or an omnipresent 'freedom' that fails in cases particular to victimization from other sources, even non-human. This led Heidegger to reconsider the question of being in order to eliminate older concepts that have misdirected our perceptions of things, namely the battle between free will and determinism, a fruitless battle that ends up with both sides slain by the hands of Derrida's famous 'deconstruction'.
Can we make any conclusions? Free will is a metaphysical concept, a concept stemming from religion and ultimatley masked by secularist 'logic'. Yet the 'will' as a concept is not necessary, for its origins of explanation reside more securely in science, namely physics and the anatomy of the body that allows being the ability to act in the first place, and secondly the environment provided for being in which to interact; free will comes from our tongues and is a pre-scientific concept brough about by revelation rather than intimate study of being that is found in the human sciences. Our ability to reject the fantasies of metaphysics allows us a more real investigation of such concepts, and, ultimately, a more earthly conclusion.
My question to the audience is this; what is your own belief of the will and how is it justified? The essay has been left incomplete and with several possible holes, but this to provide for further debate, if necessary.