Post by Liquid Len on Jan 31, 2006 19:41:25 GMT -5
agrippa said:
I think that such discussions are more interesting face to face, its somewhat tiresome on the internet Yeah, that's true. I've had endless threads on such topics where we were constantly talking at cross-purposes; the risk for doing so is very high. But it has its advantages too - you can think enough about what you want to say and choose the best way to express it, and you don't forget things like you would in the heat of debate.
agrippa said:
Its the same organism at least which changes from one state to the other.True, but it's because of our language that an "organism" is something that can change substance and form and still we can call it the same organism. So in fact - as the facts are - there is something that changes substance and form until nothing is the same as before, while we - what are we doing? We walk up to it and stick the label organism on it, which is meant to encompass all stages of its development. It's we, not nature who are saying that it's an organism and thusly remaining the same as long as it's living.
agrippa said:
Well, obviously the original would be one individual and the copy another, Do you mean individual in the sense of "self" /"person" (both how I use them)? If so: I think it's not obvious at all from the outside if they would be the same person or not. But it's clear that their consciousnesses would be completely seperated, because there would be no connection between their brains. And as I wrote, the idea that someone (one person/self) has at once two completely seperated consciousnesses looks awfully weird. I'm inclined to think it's impossible. Two consciousnesses in the same subject are automatically united to one just by being had by the same subject.
agrippa said:
Ok, simple put: Whats comes closer, your brain dead body or a living copy which is what you were shortly before the accident? In my opinion the copy would be more you than the brain dead body which is nothing any more.But the copy wouldn't be me, so I couldn't regain my consciousness through the copy (not even a little bit), no matter how similar it may be. My mind would remain as dead as without copy.
(However, there are people who believe that it's our pattern of characteristics that is our self and that only this pattern has to be recreated in order to be revived to new life... They think that the substance of our body has nothing to do with our self. It's a crazy idea, but e.g. the renowned mathematical physicist Frank Tipler has written a bestseller on precisely such a theory ("The Physics of Immortality").)
agrippa said:
Sure, didnt wanted to tell you otherwise What I wanted to show is how this subjectivity comes into existence and what it means. As long as we are healthy we feel this duration and that we exist...but those people which have defects show us how vulnerable this illusion of our brain is.
But why do you call it an illusion then? If the duration is an illusion, it means to you that it doesn't exist.
waldm said:
Some might suggest that it's a certain personality structure, a certain character that makes up your self, and that you're existing as long as this pattern exists. I'm not convinced of this (in fact I even think it's wrong), but it's at least an idea.agrippa said:
Thats what I would say. Well, I strongly doubt that you would really believe what I was thinking of - namely of theories à la Tipler... On the other hand - perhaps you've just not thought enough about your view and it's possible consequences.
agrippa said:
As long "as the Computer runs" and the data which makes up the personality ("the software part" is to a large degree present and functions, the self exists. If the self is the brain, as you concede below, then the self exists even when the computer is turned off - as long as it (the computer) remains intact.
agrippa said:
Obviously without the hardware: no software. But the software could be lost, the hardware would be still there, though probably not working properly: empty hull.Going after the analogy I'm proposing, yes.
(However, for real computers it holds true that the software can be saved on other data carriers and used on other PCs. That's probably why many people believe that the software in a computer analogy corresponds to the mind - because the mind could then survive bodily death...)
agrippa said:
Dont think so. The big difference in schizophrenics is whether they have "clear phases" in which they have at least limited access to "their software" are present, than we could speak about interruptions, thrusts of the pathological process. But thinking about an individual which would be caught in neverending halucinations without proper access to its data and without the correct function of its hardware, this could hardly be considered being the same personality - in extreme cases thats even close to braindeath, though that seldomly the case nowadays with modern medical treatment.F.e. I might want to die in a situation in which my personality was destroyed physically as well, but after the accident, it might be the case that my limited mental abilities might form an infantile version of my personality which wouldnt be able to still comprehend its own situation nor to remember the past decisions. From my perspective I would be dead then and even if this infantile self would want to exist my current will would want to die and that should be done.
In such an extreme case there would be no real continuity and therefore we could speak of the same person as I was before the assumed accident
I suppose you don't mean "person" in the sense I used it. As explained, I used it virtually synonymous with "self" - and since you concede below that the self I'm talking of, to you is the brain - then all these cases you mention remain the same persons (in the sense I used it). And because I think that it's the person that makes temporally distinct phases of a stream of consciousness to phases of the same consciousness - then it would follow that your mind (consciousenss) would be still alive ( = not dead) in the pathologically infantile version of yourself - albeit very, very handicapped of course.
You use "person" in a close semantic proximity to "personality". So you're right insofar as if the personality changes or is destroyed, then the person (in the sense you use it) is destroyed (or "dead" if you like) too.
agrippa said:
My personality and its graduell development is myself, ones the continuity is lost my body might be there, even some sort of feeling and thinking, but that wouldnt be me as I was or am since what constructed my personality which I would equate with self would be lost.The big, striking, important, even tragic difference between being alive and being dead is IMO the presence or absence of consciousness. If I had to choose between losing my consciousness forever on the one hand and my personality being replaced by a completely different one on the other hand, then I would choose the latter. My mind could at least exist on, that's better than complete extinction. (How much better would of course depend on what exactly the other personality would be like - an infantile state really wouldn't be a tempting prospect... but other, much better ones are - at least in theory! - conceivable.)
So therefore I'm not really sure if I fully understand what you mean. Do you somehow link your consciousness to the presence of your personality? And do you think that your still conscious body without your present personality wouldn't harbour your consciousness?
agrippa said:
my personality which I would equate with self would be lostObviously a contradiction to what you write further below, where you're equating it with the brain.
Probably you're not always using "self" with the same meaning.