Post by Liquid Len on Jan 16, 2006 17:12:37 GMT -5
How are we to explain our personal continuity? If we suppose that we are identical to our brains, then we're existing as long as the brain does exist. Superficially this seems to be a very clear case... But if we are very particular, then it isn't clear at all why my brain right now should be the very same object as my brain at any time in the future or past. First of all because there is no such thing as a material continuity, in the strict sense. An atom consists of the nucleus and some electrons. Electrons are not existing as the small, point-shaped, firm objects they are usually depicted as. They are more like a cloud of probabilities. And the nucleus consists of protons and neutrons, which in turn consist of quarks and gluons, and they get destroyed and reformed each 10^-23 seconds. So each 10^-23 seconds our substance has in fact changed.
Now we could disregard the substance and turn our attention to the shape, the structure, the pattern and the properties of the brain. But obviously this is changing as well during one's lifetime. Not as fast as the substance, and once one has reached a certain age, the further changes remain only minor, but still there are small changes, and of course there were much bigger ones at the earlier ages.
So how else could we explain the personal continuity?
IMO we are subjects who have certain experiences. The experiences are constantly changing, obviously. But we believe that as long as we live, the subject of our experiences doesn't change. If it changed, our experiences wouldn't be our experiences anymore, but they would belong to someone else, to the other subject who would then own them. Theoretically it's possible that some of the things we remember having experienced, were really experienced by someone else, by another subject, and that only the memory of these things has been transmitted to the subject we are. If we are not our body, this would mean, that someone else might have had our body, perhaps until some years ago, and that what we remember as a large deal of our life was lived by someone else in this same body. Or, if we are our body, we could speculate that it isn't exactly the same body anymore (which is even true), and thus we could say that we are not identical with the person that this body was some years ago. But as I said, we don't believe such things, and furthermore it's also obvious that we're existing at least for a longer time than just a fraction of a second. Therefore we have to explain why and how the subject remains constantly the same, at least for a certain time, and possibly (as we believe) for the whole life as well. So we have to ask ourselves: What are the conditions under which two temporally seperated things are identical to each other (which would mean that they are the same thing)? Like the old Greeks we could (purely in theory) distinguish between substance and form. And we could say that if one or both of these components remains the same, the object remains the same object. Perhaps both of these components are important, perhaps only one of them, or perhaps one (either substance or form), is even irrelevant. In any case, if both components change, we cannot be dealing with the same object anymore. However, some might suggest, that a constant, continuous change of an object (in both components) might preserve the identity of that object. But imo that's nonsense and only seems somewhat plausible because we normally believe to see substantial continuity everywhere in the objects around us, therefore we subconsciously presuppose it every time we're imagining a continuing object.
Neither our form nor our physical substance remains constant, hence there must be something else that's remaining the same.
This all looks like a proof of my concept of souls that I have proposed in the thread about death. So every firm materialist should be very concerned about this and eager to refute it.
What do you think?
I would say the easiest attackable part of that reasoning is perhaps where it's about electrons. Qauntum mechanics works, but its interpretation is still controversial. According to David Bohm's model for instance, electrons indeed are small point-shaped objects. And they're existing for quite a long time.
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2843/is_3_24/ai_62102221
It might sound hilarious, but perhaps our identity is an assembly of electrons?
Now we could disregard the substance and turn our attention to the shape, the structure, the pattern and the properties of the brain. But obviously this is changing as well during one's lifetime. Not as fast as the substance, and once one has reached a certain age, the further changes remain only minor, but still there are small changes, and of course there were much bigger ones at the earlier ages.
So how else could we explain the personal continuity?
IMO we are subjects who have certain experiences. The experiences are constantly changing, obviously. But we believe that as long as we live, the subject of our experiences doesn't change. If it changed, our experiences wouldn't be our experiences anymore, but they would belong to someone else, to the other subject who would then own them. Theoretically it's possible that some of the things we remember having experienced, were really experienced by someone else, by another subject, and that only the memory of these things has been transmitted to the subject we are. If we are not our body, this would mean, that someone else might have had our body, perhaps until some years ago, and that what we remember as a large deal of our life was lived by someone else in this same body. Or, if we are our body, we could speculate that it isn't exactly the same body anymore (which is even true), and thus we could say that we are not identical with the person that this body was some years ago. But as I said, we don't believe such things, and furthermore it's also obvious that we're existing at least for a longer time than just a fraction of a second. Therefore we have to explain why and how the subject remains constantly the same, at least for a certain time, and possibly (as we believe) for the whole life as well. So we have to ask ourselves: What are the conditions under which two temporally seperated things are identical to each other (which would mean that they are the same thing)? Like the old Greeks we could (purely in theory) distinguish between substance and form. And we could say that if one or both of these components remains the same, the object remains the same object. Perhaps both of these components are important, perhaps only one of them, or perhaps one (either substance or form), is even irrelevant. In any case, if both components change, we cannot be dealing with the same object anymore. However, some might suggest, that a constant, continuous change of an object (in both components) might preserve the identity of that object. But imo that's nonsense and only seems somewhat plausible because we normally believe to see substantial continuity everywhere in the objects around us, therefore we subconsciously presuppose it every time we're imagining a continuing object.
Neither our form nor our physical substance remains constant, hence there must be something else that's remaining the same.
This all looks like a proof of my concept of souls that I have proposed in the thread about death. So every firm materialist should be very concerned about this and eager to refute it.
What do you think?
I would say the easiest attackable part of that reasoning is perhaps where it's about electrons. Qauntum mechanics works, but its interpretation is still controversial. According to David Bohm's model for instance, electrons indeed are small point-shaped objects. And they're existing for quite a long time.
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2843/is_3_24/ai_62102221
It might sound hilarious, but perhaps our identity is an assembly of electrons?