Somalis kicking Italian and British ass « Thread Started on Jan 27, 2006, 6:36pm »
Alot of people don't hear much about the resistance against these foreigners trying to dominate Somalis and others and the resistance against these European aliens who attacked the African continent so to subjugate them. Alot of westerners think that Africa went under quite easily and that the colonizers just marched in without any objection. But alot of people dont know about the sacrifice the british had to endure, the death and blood shred in quite amount especially in countries such as Sudan with the Mahdi's inflicting some serious damage, the Zulu's the most powerful bantus who almost crushed the british colonial policy infront of their nose, and lastly the Somali dervish movement who kicked the british force so that the british had to fully release the first ever aerial bombardment on African grounds so to cowardly try to finish them once and for all, these conflicts are not much heard of.
Here is the story of the Somali resistance, againt the British and Italians, remember Somalis were less than two millions at this time and had to deal with not only Italians and british but also Abyssinians. Almost 50% percent of the male population in northern somalia perished during this time.
Given the frequency and virulence of the Ethiopian raids, it was natural that the first pan-Somali or Greater Somalia effort against colonial occupation, and for unification of all areas populated by Somalis into one country, should have been directed at Ethiopians rather than at the Europeans; the effort was spearheaded by the Somali dervish resistance movement. The dervishes followed Mahammad Abdille Hasan of the puritanical Salihiyah tariqa (religious order or brotherhood). His ability as an orator and a poet (much-valued skills in Somali society) won him many disciples, especially among his own Dulbahante and Ogaden clans (both of the Daarood clan-family). The British dismissed Hasan as a religious fanatic, calling him the "Mad Mullah." They underestimated his following, however, because from 1899 to 1920, the dervishes conducted a war of resistance against the Ethiopians and British, a struggle that devastated the Somali Peninsula and resulted in the death of an estimated one-third of northern Somalia's population and the near destruction of its economy. One of the longest and bloodiest conflicts in the annals of sub-Saharan resistance to alien encroachment, the dervish uprising was not quelled until 1920 with the death of Hasan, who became a hero of Somali nationalism. Deploying a Royal Air Force squadron recently returned from action in combat in World War I, the British delivered the decisive blow with a devastating aerial bombardment of the dervish capital at Taleex in northern Somalia.
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Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, better known as the Mad Mullah, was born in the interior of Somaliland, some say at Kirrit, in the late sixties, his father an Ogaden Somali, his mother a Somali of the Dolbahanta tribe. His boyhood was much like that of other Somali boys, spent sometimes with his fellow-tribesmen and their stock in the interior, sometimes in Berbera. Now and again, perhaps, he voyaged in some friendly buggalow carrying Somali produce, hides and ghee and sheep, to Aden and the Arabian coast. Be this as it may, when he was about seventeen or eighteen, he determined to see the world, and is said to have enrolled at Aden as a fireman in one of the liners plying between East and West. His employment in this capacity must have greatly influenced his future career. For, doubtless, at Egyptian ports in native caravanserais he often listened awestruck to many a strange story of the Mahdi from the mouths of refugees from the Sudan. Following on his experiences at sea, Mohammed having now fully attained to man's estate, made the pilgrimage to Mecca - a journey which is the common ambition of all Somalis. So impressed was he by what he heard and saw that he made several subsequent journeys to the sacred city, joining the Mohammed Salih, an insignificant but fanatical Mohammedan sect, whose tenets are of a harsh and uncompromising nature as compared with those of the Kadariyah, which is the predominant sect in Somaliland. On his return from the last of these pilgrimages in 1895, he gained some notoriety in Berbera by denouncing certain practices of the Kadariyah to somewhat bored and unsympathetic audiences. With all the strident fervency of a born agitator he would inveigh against the luxury of the age, the immorality of chewing " kat," or the gluttony of gorging the fat of sheep's tail. For a living he depended upon the alms of the charitable; and there is an old Arab woman in Berbera who has often wondered whether he would repay the four annas she lent him in the days of his need should the opportunity ever came. He gained but few adherents among the comparatively sophisticated inhabitants of Berbera, and so in 1899 he repaired to the interior, where he lived in the Nogal valley among his mother's kin. Here he started a movement advocating the expulsion of the British infidel from his Mohammedan country. Many adherents Looked to his banner. Some were fired by his religious and political teaching. Others were attracted by promises of the wealth to be gained by raiding the stock of those tribes which espoused the infidel's cause, others again were inspired by a dual motive, religious and material: they saw an admirable opportunity to lay up for themselves treasure in the Mohammedan paradise by confiscating other tribes' treasure upon earth. For three years the Mullah disciplined his follower", eradicating the tribal feeling, which is normally one of the chief characteristics of the Somalis, and substituting his own authority for that of the elders of the tribes. Then early in 1899 he perpetrated his first overt set of hostility to the British Government. Suddenly swooping down upon Burao, a considerable native centre some eighty miles from Berbera, he raided the wealthy Habr Yunis tribe, and forced a section of the Dolbahanta to join him. After the raid, his fighting men were estimated to number 3000.
To resume, the Mullah followed up his first coup of April 1899 by a further successful foray against the Habr Yunis in August, and he reoccupied Burao with a force estimated at 5000 men. He gave himself out as the Mahdi; and ominous rumours spread foretelling an advance on Berbera. The Consul General urged an expedition on the Home Government, but our commitments elsewhere, more particularly in south Africa, were such as to preclude the immediate adoption of this course. During the first seven months of 1900, the Mullah was comparatively inactive, but in August he suddenly swooped down upon the Aidegalla tribe and caused all the friendly tribes to evacuate the Haud in confusion. Next month the Habr Awal tribe suffered severely at his hands.
It would be superfluous to discuss here in any detail the campaigns which followed. They are exhaustively described in the Official History of the Operations in Somaliland, 1901-04, published by the War Office in 1907; and it will be sufficient for the purposes of this paper to outline very briefly the general course of events.
The first expedition started in April 1901, and operations terminated in the following July. The force employed consisted of a locally-enlisted and hurriedly-trained levy of 1500 men, of whom 500 were mounted. The casualties inflicted on the Dervishes were estimated at some 1200 killed and wounded, and, in addition, 800 prisoners were taken, including some notable headmen.
The Mullah's power had thus been appreciably shaken, and for a time he remained quiescent. But not for long. In October 1901 he renewed his activities, and, thanks to the illicit arms traffic, he had, by January 1902, not only recovered from his losses, but had forced the majority of the Dolbahanta tribe to return to his standard. By the time our second expedition was launched in June 1902, his following was estimated at 15,000, of whom 12,000 were said to be mounted and 1500 armed with rifles. Against this, our Expeditionary Force consisted of some 2000 rifles, partly King's African Rifles, but principally locally enlisted and locally- trained Somalis. During this expedition, which culminated in the severe but successful action fought at Erigo in October 1902, the Dervishes sustained some 1400 casualties, lost a large number of prisoners and some 25,000 camels, in addition to many sheep, cattle, and horses. But disorganized transport and the shaken moral of the Somali levies prevented the pursuit of the Mullah to his retreat in the Mudug district.
It was now evident that the situation was such as to demand regular and seasoned troops. At the time of the action of Erigo, the force in Somaliland had consisted of 2400 rifles, of which no less than 1500 were local levies. This force was immediately increased by a further contingent of 900 King's African Rifles, and by 300 Indian infantry. A strong column was to advance from Obbia in Italian Somaliland and occupy the Mudug. Another column was to operate on the Berbera-Bohotleh line. And, simultaneously, an Abyssinian fores of 5000 rifles, accompanied by British officers, was to advance along the Webi Shebeli, to prevent the Mullah's retreat westward. The advance from Obbia commenced on the 22nd February 1903; and the enemy immediately fell back on Walwal and Wardair, denying us an opportunity of trying conclusions with his main force. On two occasions, however, small advance parties engaged large forces of Dervishes. At Gumburu, a reconnaissance of two companies of the 2nd King's African Rifles and 48 rifles of the 2nd Sikhs came up with the Mullah's main force, commanded, so it is said, by their chief in person. The fight which ensued appears to have lasted two and a half hours. The Dervishes charged the British square from dense bush some 300 to 600 yards distant, their horsemen and riflemen being driven back time and again with cruel losses. The square was eventually broken by a rush of spearmen, but not before all our ammunition had been exhausted. The Dervish casualties, estimated by some at 2700, are unknown: for no British officer survived to tell the true story of Gumburu. Our casualties were all officers (9) and 187 men killed and 29 men wounded. Another action at Daratoleh - in which were engaged some 800 Dervishes, flushed with their victory at Gumburu, with their leaders wearing the uniforms of the dead British officers - resulted in the infliction of heavy casualties on the enemy, our losses amounting to 2 officers and 13 men killed, and 4 officers and 25 men wounded. In the meantime the Abyssinians inflicted a crushing defeat on the Dervishes, claiming to have killed 1000 of their spearmen. Immediately after this engagement, which took place on the 31st May 1903, the Mullah made a daring but successful movement eastward to the Nogal valley. Unfortunately, however, it was impossible to intercept this movement, as, owing to camel transport and other difficulties, our troops were being withdrawn to Bohotleh.
His Majesty's Government now derided on a further increase to our force in Somaliland in view of the Mullah's position in the Nogal and its proximity to our sphere. More than 8000 troops, of which 1000 were British, were employed, in the hope that the Mullah's power would be permanently shattered. The enemy's force, which numbered between 6000 and 8000 fighting Dervishes, was concentrated at Jidballi, where the Mullah, deriding to make a stand, received a most crushing defeat. His casualties in the actual fight at Jidballi (both January 1904) must have been very large; but far greater were his losses during the course of his subsequent flight northwards to Jidali, and thence eastward into Italian territory. On the other hand, our casualties were slight, except in officers, of whom 3 were killed and 9 wounded, out of a total of 27 killed and 37 wounded of all ranks. It appears that the Mullah only sought sanctuary in Italian territory after receiving solemn assurances of a safe passage from Osman Mahmoud, the Sultan of the Mijjertein, the Italian Somali tribe, who was equally solemnly pledged to us to prevent him from crossing the Italian frontier. Had it not been for this breach of faith, the Mullah would doubtless have had no alternative but to surrender
Thus, this fourth expedition was completely successful in all but bringing the Mullah himself to bay, and so putting an end to his movement. The greater portion of his wealth, which among a desert dwelling nomad people consists of the flocks and herds upon which their very existence depends, had been captured. The moral of his Dervishes as a fighting body had been utterly destroyed; and their numbers, estimated at 6000 to 8000 before Jidballi, could not have exceeded 800 on the conclusion of the campaign. Above all, the Mullah's personal prestige was temporarily shattered; and the discredited refugee in Italian territory must have out a poor figure as compared with the defiant enemy who, during the third expedition, indited the following letter to the British people: - I wish to rule my own country and protect my own religion. If you will, send me a letter saying whether there is to be peace or war. I intend to go from Burao to Berbera I warn you of this - I wish to fight with you. I like war, but you do not. God willing, I will take many rifles from you, but you will get no rifles or ammunition from me. I have no forts, no houses, no country. I have no cultivated fields, no silver, no gold for you to take. I have nothing. If the country were cultivated or contained houses or property, it would be worth your while to fight. The country is all jungle, and that is of no use to you. If you want wood and stone, you can get them in plenty. There are also many ant-heaps. The sun is very hot. All you can get from me is war - nothing else. I have met your men in battle, and have killed them. We are greatly pleased at this. Our men who have fallen in battle have won paradise. God fights for us. We kill, and you kill. We fight by God's order. That is the truth. We ask for God's blessing. God is with me when I write this. If you wish for war, I am happy; and, if you wish for peace, I am content also. But if you wish for peace, go Solvay from my country back to your own. If you wish for war, stay where you are. Hearken to my words. I wish to exchange a machine gun for ammunition. If you do not want it, I will sell it to some one else. bend me a letter saying whether you desire war or peace."
In March 1905, the Illig or Pestalozza Agreement was concluded between the Italian Government and the Mullah, whereby peace was declared between the Dervishes on the one hand and the British and Italian Governments on the other. The Mullah was assigned a port and certain territories in Italian Somaliland, beyond which he and his Dervishes undertook not to encroach. The Mullah also agreed to become an Italian protected subject. This agreement was, however, nullified soon after it was concluded, as the Mullah left Italian territory, and by 1907 had re-established himself on the British side, raiding and looting far and wide.
Re: Somalis kicking colonizers ass « Reply #1 on Jan 27, 2006, 6:38pm »
The Majerten and Hobyo resistance against Italians Boqor Ismaan Mahamuud's sultanate was nearly destroyed in the middle of the nineteenth century by a power struggle between him and his young, ambitious cousin, Keenadiid. Nearly five years of destructive civil war passed before Boqor Ismaan Mahamuud managed to stave off the challenge of the young upstart, who was finally driven into exile in Arabia. A decade later, in the 1870s, Keenadiid returned from Arabia with a score of Hadhrami musketeers and a band of devoted lieutenants. With their help, he carved out the small kingdom of Hobyo after conquering the local Hawiye clans. Both kingdoms, however, were gradually absorbed by the extension into southern Somalia of Italian colonial rule in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
THE NORTH-EASTERN SOMALILAND SULTANATES
The north-eastern sultanates of Majeerteen and Hobyo developed a very effective political organization with diversified measures of centralized authority over relatively large territories. Italy, Britain, Germany and France had been trying to solicit them into their sphere of influence since the early days of their competition for the Somali peninsula. In the closing decades of the 1880s Germany was the first colonial power to have built a special relationship with the Majeerteen.
To the other colonial powers' surprise however, on 7 April 1889, it was Italy who concluded a treaty of protection with the Majeerteen sultanate, having only a few months before, in December 1888, signed a similar treaty with the Hobyo sultanate. The protectorate agreements were renewed by the Majeerteen on 7 April 1895 and on 11 April 1895 by the Hobyo.
The treaty terms clearly stipulated that Italy was not to interfere in the internal affairs of the sultanates, and in order to promote the Italian Government and the sultanates' interests, Italy agreed to send commissioners to both sultanates.
By accepting Italy's protection in December 1888, Sultan Yusuf Ali of Hobyo was planning to use Italy's support in his dispute with the Sultan of Zanzibar over the border region north of Warsheekh. He was also interested in using this support against Boqor Osman of the Majeerteen Sultanate with whom he contested control over the Nugaal Valley. As a countermove against Sultan Yusuf Ali, Boqor Osman Mahamud also accepted Italy's protection. They had both signed the protectorate agreements for their own expansionist objectives, and, by exploiting the conflicting interests among competing powers, to avoid direct occupation of their territories by force.
However, the relationship between Hobyo and Italy was complicated when Sultan Yusuf Ali refused the Italian proposal to sanction a British contingent of troops to disembark at Hobyo to pursue their battle with the Daraawiish (see above) in April 1903. Because of this controversy, Sultan Yusuf Ali and his son Yusuf Ali were eventually deposed by the Italians and deported to Assab in Eritrea
Conflict of Interest The sultanate of Majeerteen lay on the utmost tip of the Horn. To the north was the Red Sea, in the east there was the Indian Ocean. To the south of Majeerteenia stretched the Nugaal Valley. To the west British Somaliland.
To define their zone of influence, the Italian and British administrations signed the Anglo-Italian Treaty of 5 May 1894 which defined the Majeerteen Sultanate as being east of the 490 Meridian. The line fell to the east of Taleh and Baran. In 1906 Cavalier Pestalozza and General Swaine signed an agreement recognising Baran as under the Majeerteen sultanate. Among other things, the Anglo-Italian treaty stipulated that the Italian government be responsible for any act committed by the Majeerteen against the people under British protection.0 All these dealings were taking place behind the backs of the peoples concerned.
In March 1901, Boqor Osman extended his border by capturing two small towns in the Mudug region. The Mudug was an area regarded as Sultan Yusuf Ali's realm. As both sultans were under Italian protection, the contention prompted Giulio Pestalozza, the Italian Consul at Aden, to sail to Baargaal, the seat of the Majeerteen court, to press Boqor Osman to retreat and respect the treaties. Boqor Osman refused to give in.
The matter worried Italy and it reasoned that unless Boqor Osman was brought under their directive they feared they could not control the sultanate. Misunderstanding and distrust was in the making. The conflict of interest was leading to confrontation as each side began accusing the other.
Whilst the situation was still in confusion, the Italian Minister in Cairo intercepted a letter from Boqor Osman seeking Ottoman protection over what the latter termed the "Independent Majeerteen Somali". Furthermore, Italy learned about the sultanate's arms build-up. Before it was too late, Italy decided to breach the treaty and to bring Boqor Osman to his knees. The Volta ship bombarded the coastal villages of Bareeda and Bender Khassim (Boosaaso), crippling the sultanate's modest arms and ammunition warehouses. Boqor Osman fled to the interior, while Italian troops captured the sea towns of Alula, Bender Khassim, Bareeda and Muranyo. Boqor Osman had been taken by surprise, and had attempted unsuccessfully to counter the Italians in too many battlefields.
Things were further complicated by other developments in the region: the Italo-British arrangements for confining the Daraawiish to the Nugaal area was growing untenable. The British had failed to secure peace with the Daraawiish and were in retreat. The good relationships which in the past Boqor Osman had had with Sayid Mahamed ended after persistent Daraawiish scorched earth raids on Majeerteen settlements. Initially Boqor Osman had repulsed invasions of his Sultanate by the Daraawiish. But armed confrontation with the Italians had made him vulnerable to the Daraawiish attacks. He turned to the Italians for an "honourable settlement".
Because of the Daraawiish threat to their Benaadir colony and the weakness of control afforded by the existing treaty with the Majeerteen, the Italians opted to open a dialogue with Boqor Osman. After long negotiations, in March 1910, they signed a renewal of the treaty but with a more rigid and effective protectorate powers and in their own interpretation.
From Sovereign to Subject: The Elimination of the North-Eastern Sultanates
The dawn of fascism in the early 1920s heralded a change of strategy for Italy as the north-eastern sultanates were soon to be forced within the boundaries of La Grande Somalia according to the plan of fascist Italy. With the arrival of Governor Cesare Maria De Vecchi on 15 December 1923 things began to change for that part of Somaliland. Italy had access to these parts under the successive protection treaties, but not direct rule. The fascist government had direct rule only over the Benaadir territory.
Given the defeat of the Daraawiish movement in the early 1920s and the rise of fascism in Europe, on 10 July 1925 Benito Mussolini gave the green light to De Vecchi to start the takeover of the north-eastern sultanates. Everything was to be changed and the treaties abrogated.
The real principles of colonialism meant possession and domination of the people, and the protection of the country from other greedy powers. Italy's interpretation of the treaties of protection with the north-eastern sultanates was comparable to her view of the Treaty of Uccialli with Abyssinia, and meant absolute control of the whole territory. Never mind that the subsequent tension between Abyssinia and Italy had culminated in 1896 in the battle of Adwa in which the Italians were overwhelmed and outmanoeuvred. The Italians had not learned their lesson, they were committing the same historical mistake.
Governor De Vecchi's first plan was to disarm the sultanates. But before the plan could be carried out there should be sufficient Italian troops in both sultanates. To make the enforcement of his plan more viable, he began to reconstitute the old Somali police corps, the Corpo Zaptié, as a colonial force.
Preparations for the Invasion In preparation for the plan of invasion of the sultanates, the Alula Commissioner, E. Coronaro received orders in April 1924 to carry out a reconnaissance on the territories targeted for invasion. In spite of the forty year Italian relationship with the sultanates, Italy did not have adequate knowledge of the geography. During this time, the Stefanini-Puccioni geological survey was scheduled to take place, so it was a good opportunity for the expedition of Coronaro to join with this.
Coronaro's survey concluded that the Majeerteen Sultanate depended on sea traffic, therefore, if this were blocked any resistance which could be mounted came after the invasion of the sultanate would be minimal. As the first stage of the invasion plan Governor De Vecchi ordered the two Sultanates to disarm. The reaction of both sultanates was to object, as they felt the policy was in breach of the protectorate agreements. The pressure engendered by the new development forced the two rival sultanates to settle their differences over Nugaal possession, and form a united front against their common enemy.
The First Casualty: Hobyo The Sultanate of Hobyo was different from that of Majeerteen in terms of its geography and the pattern of the territory. It was founded by Yusuf Ali in the middle of the nineteenth century in central Somaliland. The jurisdiction of Hobyo stretched from El-Dheere through to Dusa-Mareeb in the south-west, from Galladi to Galkayo in the west, from Jerriiban to Garaad in the north-east, and the Indian Ocean in the east.
By 1st October, De Vecchi's plan was to go into action. The operation to invade Hobyo started in October 1925. Columns of the new Zaptié began to move towards the sultanate. Hobyo, El-Buur, Galkayo, and the territory between were completely overrun within a month. Hobyo was transformed from a sultanate into an administrative region. Sultan Yusuf Ali surrendered. Nevertheless, soon suspicions were aroused as Trivulzio, the Hobyo commissioner, reported movement of armed men towards the borders of the sultanate before the takeover and after. Before the Italians could concentrate on the Majeerteen, they were diverted by new setbacks. On 9 November, the Italian fear was realised when a mutiny, led by one of the military chiefs of Sultan Ali Yusuf, Omar Samatar, recaptured El-Buur. Soon the rebellion expanded to the local population. The region went into revolt as El-Dheere also came under the control of Omar Samatar. The Italian forces tried to recapture El-Buur but they were repulsed. On 15 November the Italians retreated to Bud Bud and on the way they were ambushed and suffered heavy casualties.
While a third attempt was in the last stages of preparation, the operation commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Splendorelli, was ambushed between Bud Bud and Buula Barde. He and some of his staff were killed. As a consequence of the death of the commander of the operations and the effect of two failed operations intended to overcome the El-Buur mutiny, the spirit of Italian troops began to wane. The Governor took the situation seriously, and to prevent any more failure he requested two battalions from Eritrea to reinforce his troops, and assumed lead of the operations. Meanwhile, the rebellion was gaining sympathy across the country, and as far a field as Western Somaliland.
The fascist government was surprised by the setback in Hobyo. The whole policy of conquest was collapsing under its nose. The El-Buur episode drastically changed the strategy of Italy as it revived memories of the Adwa fiasco when Italy had been defeated by Abyssinia. Furthermore, in the Colonial Ministry in Rome, senior officials distrusted the Governor's ability to deal with the matter. Rome instructed De Vecchi that he was to receive the reinforcement from Eritrea, but that the commander of the two battalions was to temporarily assume the military command of the operations and De Vecchi was to stay in Muqdisho and confine himself to other colonial matters. In the case of any military development, the military commander was to report directly to the Chief of Staff in Rome.
While the situation remained perplexed, De Vecchi moved the deposed sultan to Muqdisho. Fascist Italy was poised to re-conquer the sultanate by whatever means. To manoeuvre the situation within Hobyo, they even contemplated the idea of reinstating Ali Yusuf. However, the idea was dropped after they became pessimistic about the results.
To undermine the resistance, however, and before the Eritrean reinforcement could arrive, De Vecchi began to instil distrust among the local people by buying the loyalty of some of them. In fact, these tactics had better results than had the military campaign, and the resistance began gradually to wear down. Given the anarchy which would follow, the new policy was a success.
On the military front, on 26 December 1925 Italian troops finally overran El-Buur, and the forces of Omar Samatar were compelled to retreat to Western Somaliland.
The Second Casualty: The Fall of the Majeerteen Sultanate
By neutralising Hobyo, the fascists could concentrate on the Majeerteen. In early October 1924, E. Coronaro, the new Alula commissioner, presented Boqor Osman with an ultimatum to disarm and surrender. Meanwhile, Italian troops began to pour into the sultanate in anticipation of this operation. While landing at Haafuun and Alula, the sultanate's troops opened fire on them. Fierce fighting ensued and to avoid escalating the conflict and to press the fascist government to revoke their policy, Boqor Osman tried to open a dialogue. However, he failed, and again fighting broke out between the two parties. Following this disturbance, on 7 October the Governor instructed Coronaro to order the Sultan to surrender; to intimidate the people he ordered the seizure of all merchant boats in the Alula area. At Haafuun, Arimondi bombarded and destroyed all the boats in the area.
On 13 October Coronaro was to meet Boqor Osman at Baargaal to press for his surrender. Under siege already, Boqor Osman was playing for time. However, on 23 October Boqor Osman sent an angry response to the Governor defying his order. Following this a full scale attack was ordered in November. Baargaal was bombarded and razed to the ground. This region was ethnically compact, and was out of range of direct action by the fascist government of Muqdisho. The attempt of the colonisers to suppress the region erupted into explosive confrontation. The Italians were meeting fierce resistance on many fronts. In December 1925, led by the charismatic leader Hersi Boqor, son of Boqor Osman, the sultanate forces drove the Italians out of Hurdia and Haafuun, two strategic coastal towns on the Indian Ocean. Another contingent attacked and destroyed an Italian communications centre at Cape Guardafui, on the tip of the Horn. In retaliation Bernica and other warships were called on to bombard all main coastal towns of the Majeerteen. After a violent confrontation Italian forces captured Ayl (Eil), which until then had remained in the hands of Hersi Boqor. In response to the unyielding situation, Italy called for reinforcements from their other colonies, notably, Eritrea. With their arrival at the closing of 1926, the Italians began to move into the interior where they had not been able to venture since their first seizure of the coastal towns. Their attempt to capture Dharoor Valley was resisted, and ended in failure.
De Vecchi had to reassess his plans as he was being humiliated on many fronts. After one year of exerting full force he could not yet manage to gain a result over the sultanate. In spite of the fact that the Italian navy sealed the sultanate's main coastal entrance, they could not succeed in stopping them from receiving arms and ammunition through it. It was only early 1927 when they finally succeeded in shutting the northern coast of the sultanate, thus cutting arms and ammunition supplies for the Majeerteen. By this time, the balance had tilted to the Italian's side, and in January 1927 they began to attack with a massive force, capturing Iskushuban, at the heart of the Majeerteen. Hersi Boqor unsuccessfully attacked and challenged the Italians at Iskushuban. To demoralise the resistance, ships were ordered to raze and bombard the sultanate's coastal towns and villages. In the interior the Italian troops confiscated livestock. By the end of the 1927 the Italians had nearly taken control of the sultanate. Defeated and humiliated, Hersi Boqor and his top staff were forced to retreat to Ethiopia in order to rebuild the forces. However, they had an epidemic of cholera which frustrated all attempts to recover his force.
After two years of devastating war in which thousands of civilians died and the entire economy of the sultanate was ruined, razing all coastal towns and villages, the Italian colonial administration could boast that it had broken the Majeerteen resistance and put an end to an era in Somaliland. Boqor Osman fled to the British Somaliland, but was handed back to the Italians. In November the formal act of surrender took place in Hurdia, and Boqor Osman dramatically consigned his sword to Governor De Vecchi. Later Boqor Osman was exiled to Muqdisho. With the elimination of the north-eastern sultanates and the breaking of the Benaadir resistance, from this period henceforth, Italian Somaliland was to become a reality. The partition of Somaliland was already shaping during this period and the fate of the Somalis was at the mercy of the colonial powers.